


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5 November 1992



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-92-148

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5 November 1992

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## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### GCC Envoy to EC Opens Brussels Offices

93AE0040A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 11 Oct 92 p 10

[Report from Brussels by Nur-al-Din al-Furaydi: "First GCC Ambassador to EC: Opening Gulf Mission Offices in Brussels a Milestone in Relations With Europe"]

[Text] Mushtaq Bin-'Abdallah al-Salih, the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) first ambassador to the European Community [EC], told AL-HAYAH that opening the offices of the GCC's permanent mission in Brussels is a qualitative milestone in relations between the GCC and the EC, especially because the GCC is new to diplomatic representation and this is its first mission abroad.

Gulf and European diplomatic sources called the arrival a few days ago of the GCC's first ambassador to the European Community a significant indicator that the GCC and EC countries are determined to push for political dialogue and for economic cooperation in all fields. It also provides a direct channel between the [GCC] mission in Brussels and the Secretariat General in Riyadh to complement the usual operations of the missions of Gulf states represented in Brussels (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE). It is likewise expected that channels of communications between Brussels and Riyadh will be further boosted when the mission opens its offices in Riyadh at a later date, regardless of natural differences involving certain aspects of negotiations on free trade.

The ambassador, commenting on proposals submitted by the mission to the GCC negotiating team earlier this year, said that the Gulf team is scheduled to meet early next week to continue its scrutiny of European proposals in order to crystallize the ideas proposed by the Europeans and gradually develop concepts to be presented to them at a later date.

What is described here as "the slow pace of Gulf negotiators" was dubbed by Ambassador Mushtaq as a "healthy phenomenon, because the position to be taken (on European proposals) will be the result of an economic analysis of the region. Observers familiar with the development of European unity have learned that any common experience requires a transition period."

The mission's proposals involve the establishment of a zone for gradual free trade and also aim at subjecting Gulf chemical products to tax systems during a transition period that will range from eight to 12 years. European proposals, on the other hand, call for measures to protect budding industries in the Arab Gulf region.

Initial Gulf reaction, however, described the European proposals as imbalanced. Ambassador Mushtaq, saying that the Gulf wishes to protect budding industries, would not comment on the recommendations of European negotiations "because they are still being studied by members of the Gulf negotiating team in Riyadh."

The proposals on free trade face the opposition of European petrochemical industries, which fear competition by Gulf chemical products and are concerned about "their negative impact on European industrial utilization capacity."

The GCC ambassador said that petrochemicals "are not of the essence in relations between the GCC and the EC, which are differentiated by their strategic dimension, belief in the tenets of free economy, and respect for international law." He added that "we do not view relations between the two groups from one narrow perspective."

On the carbon tax proposal offered by the European mission early last summer, he said that the Gulf states "do not differ with European or other countries on environmental issues. Rather, they share environmental concerns with the European Community, as a whole, but they doubt the usefulness of such a tax. Instead, they propose to emphasize investments in clean technologies, including the creation of an international fund to safeguard them."

### Foundation Invests in 84 Projects in 1991

93AE0040B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 12 Oct 92 p 11

[Report from Dubayy: "Industry Leads Investment Projects in Arab Countries; Kuwait Is Largest Investor, With More Than \$500 Million"]

[Text] The Arab Investment Guarantee Organization announced that 84 projects were proposed as investments in the Arab world in 1991. The projects ranged in estimated costs from \$1 million to \$2.331 billion each.

The projects fell into various sectors, but the industrial sector had the lead, with 81 percent of total proposed investments. The agricultural sector ranked second, with 16.6 percent, followed by the services sector, with 2.4 percent.

The organization emphasized that total licensed private intra-Arab investments in 1991 amounted to about \$923 million, a 130 percent increase from the 1990 figure of \$400 million.

AL-HAYAH obtained a copy of a report distributed by the organization to a narrow circle of recipients in the Arab world. The report said that Egypt received the largest volume of incoming investments last year, with about \$651.3 million in investments, for an increase of 607.6 percent over 1990. Saudi Arabia ranked second, with licensed investments of \$159.6 million, an increase of 97.5 percent over 1990.

The UAE occupied third place, with licensed investments of about \$44.6 million, for an increase of 14.1 percent over 1990. Tunisia placed fourth among Arab investment recipients, followed by Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, Iraq, Qatar, Libya, and the Sultanate of Oman.

The report explained that Kuwait was the leading investor in Arab countries last year, with investments of about \$524.3 million in seven Arab states—Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt.

Bahrain was the second largest investor, with total investments of some \$114 million in three Arab countries—the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Investments from Saudi Arabia ranked third, with \$111.8 million invested in seven Arab countries—Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain, Tunisia, Qatar, Egypt, and Morocco. Libyan investments were in fourth place, with \$42.7 million invested in three countries—the UAE, Tunisia, and Egypt.

The organization said that investment opportunities in the UAE exist mostly in petrochemical industries, which essentially use natural gas as fuel and raw material; in oil-related support industries; in food industries to absorb surplus farm, animal, and fish production; and in export industries at the Jabal 'Ali zone in Dubayy. Investment opportunities also exist for service firms and financial firms to support Jabal 'Ali's export industries.

The organization further stated in its report that the General Organization for Industry in Abu Dhabi has available a number of feasibility studies for industrial projects in date processing, cookie manufacturing, fish fodder, toilet paper, solar water heaters, wire manufacturing, plaster, fire alarm systems, cardboard boxes for packaging, light cement, automobile batteries, cooking oil, ammonia, building supplies, suitcases, and the assembly of refrigerators and stoves.

It added that last year the UAE licensed 321 projects that were financed by Arab investors in full or in part. The projects had combined a capital of 527.6 million dirhams and were involved with commerce, industry, construction, services, and tourism.

Those projects were financed by investors from Saudi Arabia (35,095 million dirhams), Bahrain (26,302 million dirhams), Syria (22,940 million dirhams), Kuwait (19,980 million dirhams), Egypt (17,169 million dirhams), Qatar (11,735 million dirhams), the Sultanate of Oman (6,224 million dirhams), Lebanon (5,240 million dirhams), Palestine (4,906 million dirhams), Jordan (3,637 million dirhams), Yemen (320,000 dirhams), Libya (100,000 dirhams), Somalia (70,000 dirhams), Algeria (50,000 dirhams), and Tunisia (15,000 dirhams). This is in addition to an Arab joint venture that is valued at 7.7 million dirhams.

### Series Describes Jordan-Iraq Trade

93AE0017A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 15, 16, 17 Oct 92

[Article: "Jordan-Iraq Trade"]

[15 Oct p 10]

[Text] From the Hashemite and al-Husayni Mosque Squares in the heart of Amman to five-star luxury hotels in Western Amman, a person cannot help but notice the large numbers of Iraqi nationals who came to Jordan for a number of reasons, but most importantly for buying and selling.

Conspicuous among them are Iraqi women draped in black garb that covers the entire body and part of the head. They sit in Hashemite Square, al-Husayni Mosque Square, or similar native quarters of Amman, peddling a few commodities, such as cigarettes, packaged dates, and certain accessories, in return for a few piasters.

But this native vignette disappears when you move to the western sector of Amman, which houses the remnants of Iraqi aristocracy for which life in Iraq is no longer suitable. The area is also the residence of a vanguard class that finds in Jordan-Iraq trade an opportunity to achieve wealth. The people usually reside in grand hotels or luxury villas.

Those and the others talk only of one thing—the bad economic situation in Iraq, which has afflicted everyone without exception to his degree of wealth or lack of it.

Men and women of the native [lower] classes come [to Jordan] for an opportunity to sell their modest goods for a few Jordanian dinars, which they exchange on their return home for Iraqi dinars at the rate of less than 40 fils per Iraqi dinar. In contrast, large Iraqi merchants in western Amman make substantive deals with Jordanians and non-Jordanians for food products allowed into Iraq under Security Council Resolution No. 687. These include sugar, rice, flour, tea, and [cooking] oils, as well as medicine. Most of the latter is imported from Jordan, where the pharmaceutical industry is considered advanced.

The men and women of the native classes come to sell their few offerings and go back to Iraq laden with essential goods, then return to Jordan in endless overland travel that covers more than 2,000 km per round trip. In contrast, wealthy merchants stay longer in Amman in order to follow through on their contracts and deals, await the arrival of the goods they ordered from abroad, or attend to the formalities for the release of the arriving goods from the free zone in the City of al-Zarqa' near Amman. A large number of Iraqi merchants moved their headquarters to the Jordanian capital, where they opened offices to pursue their mercantile activities.

Even though such offices are still being opened in Amman, more than 180,000 Iraqis have already been granted residence in Amman, according to a Jordanian official. One condition for Jordanian residence, among others, is that the merchant maintain a Jordanian bank account with a minimum balance of \$50,000.

The presence in Jordan of such a large number of Iraqis has led, among other factors, to stimulating Jordanian trade as Jordanian merchants enter into partnerships with their Iraqi counterparts to the benefit of both. Still more Jordanian merchants act as agents for Iraqi merchants who opted to remain in Iraq. In most cases, the goods Iraq needs are primarily foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals in return for which Iraq sends dates and woollens.



One Jordanian merchant told AL-HAYAH that huge amounts of dates arrived in Jordan last year and in the first quarter of this year and that Jordan could therefore begin a date processing industry. He added that he was personally thinking of doing just that, in view of the availability of supplies at such cheap prices.

Furthermore, Iraqi crude is imported to Jordan in tanks and is refined at the Jordan refinery under special UN authorization that allows Jordan to import crude in tanks but not through the pipeline that Iraq has been enjoined from operating since its invasion of Kuwait in Aug 1990.

Although there is a degree of smuggling forbidden goods into Iraq, such operations are extremely limited, according to Iraqi and Jordanian merchants, especially in comparison with smuggling activity across the Kurdish region in northern Iraq or across Iran. Furthermore, the merchants added, smuggling is too big a word to describe such operations, which usually involve easily carried packages and boxes that could be handed over to travelers on the large buses that cross the Iraqi-Jordanian border each day carrying thousands of passengers.

Cigarettes, of which thousands of packets are smuggled daily in the same way, are almost exclusively of three makes—Hollywood, which sells for about 850 Iraqi dinars for the large size; Viceroy, which goes for about 95 dinars for the large size; and Gold Coast, whose large size sells for 120 dinars. An Iraqi merchant told AL-HAYAH that those prices are considered reasonable in Iraq, being lower than what cigarettes go for in the Kurdish region, which has become, as Iraqi rumors have it, an arena for large-scale smuggling in the absence of both Iraqi and Turkish controls. The same merchant added that "anything, even crude, can be smuggled across the Kurdish region."

The Kurdish region has prospered, especially after the execution last July of 42 Iraqi merchants and the arrest of some 600 others. This prosperity has come at the expense of the Jordanian market, which has been the main gateway for goods entering and leaving Iraq since the early 1980's, when the Iraq-Iran war began.

Foreign trade figures indicate that Jordanian exports to Iraq now account for about 9 percent of aggregate Jordanian exports, compared with 25 percent on the eve of the crisis in the summer of 1990.

The execution of those merchants has had a large impact on the movement of goods between the two countries. Iraqi merchants in Jordan have become too frightened, as a result, to purchase the foodstuffs that the executed Baghdad merchants sold at prices considered excessive by the regime. The merchants were consequently executed for their "avarice."

The end-result was that a large number of Jordanian merchants moved their offices to Turkey, from which they can more easily ship their goods across the Kurdish region to Iraq. The daily number of trucks that depart [Jordan] for Iraq carrying food supplies consequently shrank from

about 150 to about 10. The number of trucks crossing the Kurdish region into Iraq correspondingly increased to more than 2,000 daily.

[16 Sep p 10]

[Text] AL-HAYAH was told by Iraqi merchants that terror has reigned in Iraq since dozens of merchants were executed and hundreds of others arrested. This has adversely affected the mercantile community there.

The terror is explained, among other things, by the fact that the executions included some of Iraq's largest merchants, whose families have long been known for mercantile prowess.

Hamrat is one such prominent family that lost three of its members—Salim, Tariq, and his son, Haydar.

AL-HAYAH sources add: "Those merchants would have been able to carry some losses by selling their goods cheaper than medium-sized or small merchants could."

Another said that the merchants were executed for selling sugar at about 5 Iraqi dinars per kilogram. This means that a 50 kg sack of sugar went for about 200 dinars and a sack of flour sold for between 180 and 190 dinars. Those prices would not have been possible except for the financial wherewithal of those merchants.

Another merchant explained that a ton of sugar costs between \$300 and \$315 FOB at the Port of Aqaba. The cost goes up to about \$340 by the time it reaches the free zone in the city of al-Zarqa, where it would be sold for between \$370 and \$395. The selling price in Baghdad would vary from one merchant to another, but it would be in the range of \$390 to \$360 per ton.

This [selling] price depends on whether the merchant is large, medium-sized, or small; whether it is a wholesaler or retailer; and whether it is located in a well-to-do area or in a low income district of Baghdad.

In all cases, imports into Iraq are valued in U.S. dollars even though the goods are sold for Iraqi dinars. The dollar fetches three dinars at the official exchange rate and about 25 Iraqi dinars on the black market.

Another reason for the terror that has gripped Iraqi merchants is the manner in which the executions were carried out. The executed were forcibly taken away and tied to telephone poles in various parts of Baghdad. Signs accusing them of profiteering and of treason were hung around their necks as the public pelted them with stones, vegetables, and rotten eggs. Some merchants regard these executions more as terrorizing and tyrannizing than as punishment for profiteering and greed. Their proof is that only food merchants who sell such commodities as sugar, flour, tea, and rice were executed. No meat or poultry merchant, for example, was executed, even though the same charges apply to them.

The merchants decline to analyze the reasons, but they add that the Iraqis were surprised that the new prices set by the

government and announced after the executions were actually higher than the prices for which the merchants were executed.

The price of a 1 kg bag of sugar has been set at 8 Iraqi dinars. Iraqis who arrived in Jordan recently say that prices have begun a new spiral, even though the government has set both prices and profit margins. Wholesale profit margins have been set at 10 percent and retail margins at 5 percent.

They also say that because merchants refrain from purchasing foodstuffs, the government has ordered farmers to surrender to it both wheat and barley crops within a specific time period in order for the two commodities to be offered on the market as disguised rations to be purchased by the general public with ration cards. That measure was of limited effect because Iraq's crop of the two grains is sufficient only for a few days. The government consequently called upon the merchants to head for Jordan to buy other foodstuffs that will be sold on Iraqi markets at the prices set by government.

Iraqi merchants fear that Iraq's unprecedented price spiral may be at their expense because food prices set by the government remain constant while everything else goes up in price.

An economic expert told AL-HAYAH that Iraq's consumer price index has risen by 4,000 percent since the mid-1980's while salaries barely budged. A teacher in Iraq makes no more than 200 dinars in salary, and a practicing physician commands only 400 dinars.

As prices escalated and salaries remained almost the same, the Iraqi dinar suffered an unprecedented decline. Once one of the strongest Arab currencies, the Iraqi dinar used to be equal in value to the Kuwaiti dinar, at \$3.4 in the mid-1970's, but suffered severe losses as a consequence of the Iraq-Iran war. By the time that destructive war was over, the dinar's rate had slid to less than 35 cents and remained at that level until the eve of the Gulf crisis when it further skidded to 2.5 cents. The dinar's Jordanian currency equivalent dropped from 175 to 45 fils. Since the end of the war, the dinar has experienced sudden surges caused by news of progress in Iraqi negotiations with the United Nations to allow the export of \$1.6 billion in Iraqi crude in order to pay for purchases of foodstuffs, medicine, and medical supplies through Jordan. The two parties enter into such negotiations every six months.

With the start of negotiations in February 1992, the dinar rose in value to between 20 and 25 U.S. cents, but declined again when the talks failed. Last August's Vienna talks on the same issue boosted the dinar to between 40 and 45 cents before it dropped again and continued to decline to its current value of no more than 2 U.S. cents.

Because Jordan is Iraq's only outlet to the outside world, the dinar's value is largely determined in Jordan even though it is exchanged in other markets, as well. Jordanian money changers estimate the volume of daily Iraqi dinar transactions at about 10 million dinars, all of which are

exchanged on the black market because Jordanian banks do not deal in the Iraqi currency.

Of that 10 million, between 4 and 5 million Iraqi dinars are consumed in daily domestic [Jordanian] transactions. The remainder is shipped to Gulf markets, where it is consumed in exchange markets by Iraqis or other Arabs who wish to leave Kuwait for Iraq, or it is exported to Iran, where it finds its way back to Iraq as remittances to relatives there by Kuwaitis of Iraqi origin. The cycle is then completed and begins anew.

In all cases, Jordan remains the primary market for the Iraqi dinar, where its value is determined.

#### [17 Sep p 10]

Jordan is a gateway for Iraqi merchants who wish to deal with the outside world. It is also a gateway for those who wish to leave Iraq permanently through legal or illegal immigration to Europe and to America. Many Iraqis attempt the latter by seeking political refuge in the countries of Western Europe, which have since tightened their requirements for political asylum. In all cases, the duration of time such immigrants spend in Jordan, whether short or long, adds to the volume of Iraqi activity on Jordanian soil.

But Jordan also serves as a gateway for the pillars of the Iraqi regime, whether they are politicians or economists. A flurry of Iraqi officials visited Jordan in the period following the execution of the merchants, including the Iraqi Minister of Trade Muhammad Mahdi al-Salih; Barzan al-Tikriti, Saddam Husayn's brother and Iraq's representative to UN European headquarters; Samal Majid Faraj, Iraqi minister of planning; etc.

But none of those visits were for meeting with Jordanian officials. The planning minister was scheduled to attend the 16th session of the Economic and Social Committee for Western Asia (ESCOWA), which was held earlier this month in Amman. The visits by the minister of trade and by Saddam Husayn's brother were intended to seek a measure of rapprochement with Iraqi merchants residing in Jordan, allay their fears, and assure them that there would be no repetition of the executions.

An Iraqi merchant told AL-HAYAH that he and other Iraqi merchants in Jordan were contacted by a number of Iraqi Government officials, who proceeded to persuade them to resume shipping foods and food supplies to Iraq. He added that "those contacts were initiated when it became apparent that the executions of Iraqi merchants had an adverse effect on the markets there."

The merchant was doubtful, however, that such attempts would succeed. Some of the [Iraqi merchants] came to Jordan in compliance with Iraqi Government orders to go to Jordan and bring back food at official prices. Others came to attend wakes for the executed, whose relatives were enjoined by the government from holding their funerals in Iraq.

The merchant said that while senior Iraqi officials justify the executions and pledge not to repeat them, junior officials persuade the merchants otherwise.

He pointed out that Saddam Husayn has repeatedly threatened to execute all those convicted of profiteering and has denigrated the executed merchants as treasonous profiteers. He also pointed out similar statements by Barzan al-Tikriti and by Dr. Samal Majid Faraj. The latter stated during the ESCOWA session that the executions were justified.

The merchant wondered: "Whom do we believe, the president and his senior officials, or lesser officials who are attempting to persuade us to the contrary?"

The merchant then summarized the issue by saying that Iraqi markets currently offer the least profitability at the highest of risk.

In view of the Iraqi ban on some 140 so-called luxury items, and in view of government-regulated food prices, Iraqi merchants find no alternative but to focus their attention on northern Iraq. Most of them have kept their Amman offices, but they work through their offices, companies, or agents in Turkey to attempt a fresh start by trading in almost anything, but especially in cigarettes and spare parts.

But Jordan's trade has also suffered as a result of the executions and the consequent drop in food transactions through Jordan. This is evidenced by diminishing activity in al-Zarqa' free zone over the past one and a half months or so, in other words, since the executions, which were carried out at the end of July but not revealed until three weeks later.

A Jordanian merchant told AL-HAYAH that last month was his worst ever. Trade with Iraq nearly came to a halt. He said that his sales during the past month and a half months barely amounted to what he used to sell in only one day prior to the executions.

Arrivals from Iraq say that conditions are bad but not as bad as they used to be at the end of the Gulf war as goods gradually disappeared and their prices risen. Others say conditions have been tolerable so far, thanks to Iraqi stockpiles of food.

The executions of the 42 Iraqi merchants was followed by the removal of finance minister Majid 'Abd Ja'far. The president replaced him with a former minister of foreign affairs who is a trusted aide. The new finance minister, even though a distinguished member of the president's inner circle, has no financial or economic experience, so what can he possibly do to save Iraq from the worst crisis in its recent history?

Answers from Iraqi merchant in despair: "I have no idea."

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### Editorial Sees Arabs as U.S. Pawns Against Iran

93AE0026C London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI in Arabic  
19 Sep 92 p 11

[Editorial: "New Hemorrhage of Arab Wealth"]

[Text] It appears that the future will witness a new war in the Arab region that will be fueled by more Arab money and lives. The ultimate aim will be to unleash a terrible arms race among the Arab states themselves and between them and Iran in order to provide work for Western arms factories that were on the verge of closing and in the hope of bringing the Western economies out of their current recession.

After the destruction of Iraq and its military capabilities, Iran took advantage of the Arabs' weakness and their division into several camps and annexed three islands belonging to the UAE. The act provoked broad protests in the Arab League. Life suddenly returned to the League, after the foreign ministers of the Damascus declaration failed to reach any agreement about implementing the security portion of the agreement.

Widely circulating Iranian newspapers close to the government warned of American attempts to take control of the three islands. President Rafsanjani urged the Revolutionary Guard to be ready to defend Iranian sovereignty over the islands.

The Gulf countries certainly cannot go to war with Iran because of these islands. There are no unified Gulf defense forces, and one cannot expect the United States to hurry to send forces to fight Iran on behalf of the Arabs, as took place during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The United States apparently does not object to Iran's continued domination of the Arab region. Otherwise, the United States would not have kept silent about Iran's taking total control of the Arabian Gulf and Gulf oil exports by extending complete control over Abu Musa Island, at the entrance to the Gulf, and converting it into an advanced military base that is equipped with modern missiles.

Thus, the revived Iranian threat to Gulf security will lead to resumed purchases and stockpiling of advanced weapons. The United States has announced the sale of 72 new F-15's to Saudi Arabia, and now Kuwait is earmarking \$15 billion to renew and modernize its armed forces. Iran has reacted to these moves by buying three new submarines to entrench its naval domination of the Gulf waters.

Interestingly, the British defense minister flew to the region on an urgent mission to persuade the governments to buy British Tornado aircraft. Meanwhile, President George Bush of the United States has not hesitated to use aircraft sales to Saudi Arabia and Taiwan to improve his election luck and sway workers and their families threatened with unemployment in Minnesota and the McDonnell Douglas company, which specializes in building fighter planes.



In any case, the Arabs, their money, their islands, and their oil are the main victim of this American-Western game. Rekindling the war against Iran might not be to their advantage at this time. The reason is simple: the absence of the necessary Iraqi strength to confront Iranian strength.

The Gulf countries made a mistake when they ignored the most elementary fact about the conflict in the region. Some of them contributed to the destruction and continued starving of Iraq. Most of them went to Tehran seeking favored relations to damage the Iraqi Government in Baghdad, and they forgave all of Tehran's previous moves in the region.

Excluding Iraq from the strategic balances of power in the region will lead to Iranian hegemony paralleled by Israeli hegemony, with the Arabs encircled between the two and unable to put up any resistance. Perhaps that is what the British thinker and historian Bernard Lewis meant when he announced to his students the end of Arab nationalism and the irrevocable end of the Arabs' aspirations for unity.

#### **Riyad al-Maliki on New Rejectionist Alliance**

93AE0015A HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Sep 92 p B3

[Interview by Dani Rubenstein with Riyad al-Maliki; place and date not given: "The PLO and the Palestinian Public Have Never Terminated the Armed Struggle"]

[Text] Dr. Riyad al-Maliki is considered the central spokesman of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in the territories. He is 37 years old, was born in Bethlehem, and resides in Ramallah with his family. He studied engineering in the United States, and is currently chairman of the civil engineering department of Bir Zeit University.

Al-Maliki is invited to the important political meetings held by representatives of the West Bank and the Gaza strip with people from abroad as the representative of the Popular Front. He frequently publishes articles in the Palestinian press, in which he usually attacks the participation of the Palestinians in the peace talks in their current form. His wording is clear, concise, and expresses well the positions of the opposition to the central faction of the PLO.

Last week, the Palestinian leftist organization joined together with the Muslim groups and established the "Front of Ten," the purpose of which is to intensify the battle against the possibility of establishing autonomy in the territories. At the same time that the establishment of the new front was announced in Damascus, notices sharply attacking the political line of the PLO leadership were distributed in the territories and in east Jerusalem. In the middle of last week, a general strike was held in the territories, called for by the new organization.

[HA'ARETZ] The negotiations have been continuing for almost a year, already. Why have the opposition groups organized only now?

[al-Maliki] During the entire period since the Madrid conference, and even prior to it, notices were occasionally distributed that were signed by a few of the organizations, rejecting the peace process in its current form. Most of these organizations, however, did not refer to the talks seriously, since they expected that they would fail and that the entire process would fall apart on its own. Now, there is a renewal of the negotiations, mainly by declarations by all of the parties regarding the possibility of establishing autonomy, and talks pertaining to its essence are commencing. When it appeared to the organizations that the negotiations were approaching pragmatic stages, they decided to act.

[HA'ARETZ] Does the fact that several of these organizations act under the auspices of Syria and are headquartered in Damascus indicate that the Syrians pushed for the new organization?

[al-Maliki] Definitely not. The Syrians are not connected to this. This is solely a Palestinian issue. We know the position of the Syrians, and lately there have been items and rumors spread to the effect that the Syrians are making a major effort to reach an accord with Israel. This is very worrisome, and motivates the opposition organizations to unite for a joint struggle. It is true that there are several small Palestinian organizations that are acting under the auspices of Arab governments. There is nothing new about that, however this time the initiative for organizing the opposition is entirely self-Palestinian.

[HA'ARETZ] The leftist organizations are cooperating with the Muslim extremists this time. Is there any fear that such cooperation will aid the religious groups?

[al-Maliki] Each of the Palestinian organizations has ideological positions of its own. This time, we are not referring to a situation in which the Hamas is rejecting the political process for religious reasons, or other groups are rejecting the process for other reasons. The new front seeks to reflect the entire range of the Palestinian public that opposes the process. In other circumstances, like the election campaigns for various institutions in the territories, the leftist organizations cooperate with all of the nationalist groups against the Muslim groups. Now, in light of the political battle, this broad coalition has been established with a single goal—rejecting autonomy.

[HA'ARETZ] What is actually so terrible about autonomy? The fact is, now you have nothing. Autonomy will be a step forward.

[al-Maliki] We are struggling for national rights and political independence, and autonomy is a grave deviation from this struggle. It is dangerous because it is likely to be the final solution, rather than the interim solution. This is the most important point in the entire matter. For the Palestinians are the weakest party in the political negotiations. The Israeli Government knows this, and is offering us very limited autonomy, without any sign or hint of a possibility of transferring from such a framework to sovereignty. In the interim, negotiations with Jordan, Syria

and Lebanon are being conducted. The objective of the negotiations with the Arab states is to reach a full solution, without interim stages.

Now, let us assume that the negotiations with the Arab countries will be concluded successfully and that there will be peace treaties and normalization. What will happen with us, then? We will come in three or five years with the limited autonomy to discuss a permanent accord, and our bargaining position will be much weaker than it is today. Now, we rely on the support of the Arab states. If the state of war between Israel and the Arab states is terminated—i.e., the borders will be open, and the people will pass through freely—will the Arab countries forgo all of that in order to help us? Our situation in a few years from now, in light of peace between Israel and the Arab countries, will be a thousand times more difficult than it is now.

I claim that we have entered this process from an inferior and weak position, and it is therefore clear that the results will be detrimental to us, without any just reference to our problems and rights. There is almost no chance for us to achieve independence from this process. The Palestinians who support the process are naive and deluding themselves. They are playing around with terminology, calling autonomy by names like self-rule and interim stage, and refuse to recognize reality. Thus, they are leading the Palestinian public not to achievements, but to tragedies.

[HA'ARETZ] Does the path that you support include the continued use of weapons and armed struggle?

[al-Maliki] The entire PLO, as well as the Palestinian public, has never stopped the armed struggle. The international community also recognizes that this is a legitimate tool in the struggle for liberation. All of the Palestinian organizations are involved in this, including Fatah, which has cells—like the Black Eagle, the Fatah Hawks, and others—operating in the territories.

[HA'ARETZ] Defense elements in Israel recently published details regarding the capture of a senior commander in the Popular Front, Ahmad Katamash of Ramallah, who had been wanted for 16 years and had many documents in his possession...

[al-Maliki] There is always publicity of this type. I do not know the man and I have nothing to do with it.

[Box] The Opposition: "The Front of Ten"

- The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (George Habash).
- The Hamas, the Islamic opposition movement.
- The Front for Popular Struggle (Samir Ghawshah).
- The Islamic Jihad-Palestine (extremist Muslim organization).
- The Revolutionary Communist Party (a faction that separated from the Communist Party, led by 'Arabi 'Awwad).
- The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Nayif Hawatimah).

- The Popular Front-General Headquarters (Ahmad Jibril).
- The Palestinian Liberation Front (Abu al-'Abbas).
- The Tsaika, Organization of the Pioneers of the Popular War of Liberation.
- The Palestinian National Liberation Movement (rebellious against the Fatah, under the leadership of Abu-Musa).

#### **PLO Finds Aid for State Institutions, Housing**

92P40028A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 26 Oct 92 p 3

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] France has pledged to Abu-'Ala' [Ahmad Quray', director general of the PLO's Planning and Economic Administration], that it will offer housing aid in the occupied territories. The EC has also committed to giving \$40 million to the housing sector and similar assistance to various other sectors to create an economic strategy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that will participate in finding a nucleus for a financial cycle.

In this context, it is worth mentioning that a delegation headed by Dr. Ibrahim Sha'ban and representing the Housing Council in the occupied territories visited France early last week at the invitation of the Ministries of Housing and Equipment. This was to conclude an agreement to build new housing complexes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to solve the housing crisis there. [passage omitted]

According to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT's information, the PLO is seeking help in preparing to establish the institutions of a Palestinian state from a group of leading, influential Palestinian figures with strong links to American companies and institutions, as well as other establishments.

A Palestinian source from the front which rejects the peace negotiations with Israel has said that President Yasir 'Arafat's team is trying to build a basis for a coalition between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie that controls the affairs of the PLO and the Palestinian financial bourgeoisie to consolidate their position and status in the occupied territories.

The same source went on to tell AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the Palestinian financial bourgeoisie, which enjoys support from the United States and several other nations, has [several] demands, the most prominent of which is the breakup of the broad coalition now existing among the representative political forces within the framework of the PLO.

Another Palestinian official in the PLO denied that the Palestinian financial team has set organizational conditions and that it has not proposed anything outside the framework of the political endeavors. He added that this team is now playing a patriotic role within the framework of the PLO's general plans.



**Gazans Give Views on Separate Syrian Peace***93AE0026B Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 28 Sep 92  
pp 1, 11*

[Article by Munir Abu-Rizq: "Views of Gaza Citizens on Possible Syrian-Israeli 'Camp David'"]

[Text] Gaza—Repeated reports about the movement of the American administration and Israel toward making a separate peace with Syria have elicited varying reactions among Palestinian citizens. On the whole, these reactions stress the need for continued adherence to invariable Palestinian principles and intensified coordination among the Arab countries participating in the negotiations.

Tawfiq Abu-Khawsah said that current indications do not suggest that the Syrian regime would be interested in signing a separate "Camp David"-type agreement with Israel—but in politics, everything is possible! Nevertheless, the Palestinian position is the criterion in everything relating to the Palestinian problem. Even if such a signing takes place, invariable national principles must be preserved, and there must be a constant serious effort to develop the positions of the Arab regimes participating in the peace talks, so that they commit to a unified Arab position based on the need to find comprehensive solutions for all of the problems related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Citizen Zahir al-Afghani said that the fragmentation and disunity that the Arab scene is currently experiencing, even at the level of the negotiations, is a natural result that Iraq predicted before the NATO attack on its territory. In other words, America monopolized the new world order in order to splinter the countries of the Arab nation. The current situation confirms this reality, which will negatively effect the Palestinian cause, in general, and the Palestinian negotiator, in particular. The Syrian negotiator is snatching up the crumbs from the American table to serve Bush's aims in the coming American elections.

Al-Afghani, who is a freed prisoner close to the Arab Liberation Front, added that the Palestinian leadership as represented by the PLO must reevaluate the situation to avoid pressures we may be unable to withstand in the near future.

Commenting on reports that all of Israel's attempts in the sixth round were to bring its points of view closer to Syria's, Walid Zaqqut said that no one can say that Syria is interested in a new Camp David. That would endanger the peace for both Syria and Israel. Israel, more than anyone else, must realize that any separate solution is not in its interest and that what is wanted is a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace that guarantees real security to all of the people of the region. Zaqqut added that, under current circumstances, Syria is not ready for a new Camp David, because it can obtain what it wants without this, particularly on its domestic level.

Even if there is media progress and mutual statements, the Palestinian negotiator must not become alarmed. Rather,

he must exert pressure to strengthen this progress. He must make demands and work with the Arab parties so that concrete progress takes place in the other negotiating tracks, especially the Palestinian-Israeli track.

Dr. Sami Abu-Zarifah said that any separate solution between Syria and Israel will not bring comprehensive peace to the region. He expressed confidence that the Syrian leaders are well aware of the danger of becoming involved in such a solution.

Abu-Zarifah added that the American administration realizes that Syria is a power that should not be underestimated in the region and that any political solution between Syria and Israel might be a necessary prelude to a political solution between Palestine and Israel. At the same time, the American administration is well aware that without solving the Palestinian problem, it will never be possible to bring about a comprehensive, lasting peace in the region.

Abu-Zarifah added that what is happening at the present time is no more than trial balloons aimed at taking the pulse of the Arab sides and weakening the position of the Arab negotiator in the peace talks.

The stage artist Ghassan 'Id said that the media demagoguery by America and Israel and the trumpeting of an expected solution with Syria are aimed only at splitting Arab ranks and provoking disagreements among the Arab negotiating delegations. Syria, through the head of its negotiating delegation Muwaffaq al-'Allaf, has affirmed that the solution must be comprehensive and just. This in itself is enough to quash all the talk.

**Editorial Notes Discrepancy in Population Figures***93P40030A*

[Editorial Report] Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic of 9 October 1992 in a page 6 editorial by Tawfiq Abu-Bakr notes discrepancies between the Israeli and Palestinian population counts in the occupied territories.

Abu-Bakr quotes Israeli figures "issued a few days ago" that estimate Israel's population at 5.155 million, comprising 4.188 million Jews and 937,000 Palestinian Arabs "inside the Hebrew state...." The Israeli figures break down the Arab Palestinian population into Arab Muslims (for whom Abu-Bakr does not provide a number), 86,000 Druze, and 136,000 Christians.

Abu-Bakr then quotes a second set of figures "issued by the Arab Intellectual Seminar in Jerusalem and the Agricultural Aid Union" indicating that the population of the West Bank is 1,488,016 and the population of the Gaza Strip is 757,965. Thus, the total population of the occupied territories is 2,245,981.

Drawing on the second set of figures, Abu-Bakr notes that population growth in the occupied territories is "about 4 percent, one of the highest population growth rates in the world" and that "more than half of the Palestinians in the world are still sticking to their roots."

### **Villagers Reportedly Aid Israeli Special Forces**

93AE0016A Amman AL-RIBAT in Arabic 16 Sep 92 p 11

[Dispatch from Occupied Jerusalem: "Enemy Collaborators Undertake Army Tasks and Aid Special Death Squads"]

[Text] Palestinian citizens in the village of 'Atil near Tulkaram in the occupied West Bank report that the Israeli Army has begun to reduce its presence in the village while intensifying the activities of those who collaborate with the occupation forces. [The Israeli forces] have armed them and given them freedom of movement and of action, and even entrusted them with tasks previously handled by the Israeli Army.

Individuals whom residents suspect of collaborating with occupation forces walk the streets of 'Atil, openly carrying their personal arms. They burned one citizen's car and shot up the windows of his residence. They beat up another citizen with axes that they were carrying.

An officer of the so-called Village Civil Administration summoned the owner of the burned vehicle and told him that his attackers were armed by the occupation forces and that no retaliation against the collaborators who burned the citizen's car would be tolerated.

Palestinian citizens believe that certain "tools," as the Palestinians call them, operate within the ranks of Zionist murder squads. They cite the murder of Nur-al-Din al-'Aqqad, a young man who was killed in Khanyunis a few weeks ago while spraying some graffiti. He was heard telling a man with the special squad that assaulted him: "I recognize you, 'tool.'" The attacker responded by finishing him off with a heavy burst of machine-gun fire.

Fatah's revolutionary security apparatus issued a communique distributed 27 August in the Janin region in which it claimed responsibility for killing two accused collaborators. Mahmud Tawfiq was accused of going out in disguise to accompany the special squads. The communique said that that fact had been ascertained by subjecting the defendant to intense surveillance and that the so-called Tawfiq confessed that he was a member of the militias formed to kill targeted Palestinians.

Ibrahim Da'bur, the other defendant, was seen with Israeli death squads more than once and was observed engaging in intense surveillance in an effort to discover the whereabouts of wanted brothers.

Certain Palestinian fugitives emphasized that they were amazed by the Israeli special forces' intimate knowledge of the alleys and byways of Palestinians villages and that they therefore suspect that Arab guides accompany those forces, who depend on heavy intelligence gleaned from a network of overt and clandestine collaborators for their operations.

Certain politicians look upon the killing of collaborators to be in-fighting, but the fugitives consider them as their primary enemy and insist on their liquidation. More than

14 persons accused of collaborating with the occupation army were killed by the fugitives in the past two weeks.

### **Center Publishes Studies on Issues**

93AE0026A London AL-QU'DS AL-'ARABI in Arabic 2 Oct 92 p 4

[Article: "Maqdis Strategic Bulletin 18—Surrender Non-existent in Negotiations, State Is Balanced Option With Israelis"]

[Text] Ramallah—The Jerusalem Center for Strategic Studies [Maqdis] has published the 18th issue of its strategic bulletin, edited by the journalist Hamzah al-Samadi.

The issue contains a number of important studies and a special file on the present and future state of Palestinian institutions in the West Bank and Gaza.

The bulletin's editorial, titled "The Palestinian State: A Balanced Option Between Palestinians and Israelis," states that surrender is nonexistent in the region's notebook and that self-rule will be a fragile stability if it is not a bridge to self-determination for the Palestinian people and the establishment of their independent state.

The editorial reviews the points of disagreement and the lines of agreement between the styles of Shamir and Rabin and their theories about a solution. It notes that both have tried to inflict a crushing defeat on the Palestinian side in the negotiations.

While the editorial enumerates the benefits that Israel will reap from the establishment of a Palestinian state, it points out that not establishing it will lead to mass rallying around the Palestinian fundamentalists and zealots if either side violates the future peace treaty, which in its currently proposed form does not fulfil a minimum of national aspirations.

Under the rubric of "foundation-laying strategy" in the occupied territories and required changes, the issue's special file deals with stages in institution building and with deficiencies and geographical imbalances in the institutional network. The section also notes the lack of planning and the low level of performance in this network. It calls for creating an investigating committee, over which there should be a supervisory committee to regulate its activities. Also, ties between the masses and these institutions must be strengthened. The section also reviews the present and future activity of international agencies in the currently occupied territory and in the future state.

The second study attempts to monitor the directions of Jewish thinking in the Jewish state and the reasons for its rightward trend toward severity. Foremost among these reasons are religious concepts and historical residues. The author speaks of five paradigms that one can observe in the community and in the individual, both of which are

sinking under the weight of the religious and historical heritage, cultural and social sources, media and literature, and the economic situation.

The next study discusses women in the political scene. The author points out that although Palestinian women have participated intensively in the national struggle against occupation and have demonstrated praiseworthy talent and effectiveness, this has not brought about parallel development in their social, economic, and political position, which continues to be exercised in a traditional framework that gives them inferior status to men. The author predicts that women will become more active politically during the transition period and will try to take advantage of their active participation in the national struggle to improve their condition.

Given an independent state that one supposes will witness some sort of political stability by the Palestinian street, the author predicts that this stability will be a direct cause of injecting vitality and energy into the limbs of the traditional social system based on sexual discrimination. This system may try to restrict women even more harshly than before.

The article also deals with the military future of the region. It discusses a number of possible directions of this competition, which will continue or diminish. Another possibility is the creation of a demilitarized zone between the two sides.

The article discusses the Arab-Israeli balance of forces and the technological gap between the two sides in favor of Israel.

The author of the article calls on the two countries overseeing the current negotiations to make the Palestinians participants in the talks on disarmament in the region, as they are the party most harmed by this competition.

The case of Palestinian energy is raised for discussion. The study describes the energy needs of the Palestinian state until the year 2000. It points out that from a Palestinian point of view the energy question requires the consideration of a number of points, especially the current and future energy needs of the occupied territories and sources from which the state could obtain energy at an appropriate cost and on appropriate terms. The author also reviews the means of transporting energy from the source to the occupied territories, ways of storing and distributing it, and the extent to which these things are influenced by political interests and international economic relations.

The final article in the bulletin discusses the major historical stages in the life of Yitzhaq Rabin. It describes him as a general with his back to the wall. It indicates the impact these stages have had on his vision of peace with Arabs and Palestinians.

Maqdis, it should be mentioned, was founded in 1990 and is directed by Dr. Sari Nusaybah and Hamzah al-Samadi. The center is interested in studying issues related to the future and strategy of the Palestinian cause.

### Jerusalem Arab Population Decrease Noted

93AE0023C London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
30 Sep 92 p 16

[Article: "Decrease of Arab Population of Jerusalem"]

[Text] Amman—A report by the Jerusalem Center for Strategic Studies states that the number of Arab Muslim and Christian residents in Jerusalem and surrounding villages has decreased since 1967 from about one-quarter million to 135,000.

The decrease in the Arab population has many reasons, which stem from the Israeli military occupation, its repressive behavior, restrictions on everyday life, and the prevention of Arabs from building new housing for themselves.

The need for housing accumulates every year. Unable to find housing for themselves, residents are forced to leave Jerusalem to live in other Arab lands and are no longer considered residents of Jerusalem.

Large numbers of Arab Christians are said to have emigrated to other countries, while others have been forced to live in other places on the West Bank.

### Statistical Profile of Janin District Published

93AE0023B Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 22 Sep 92  
pp 1,11

[Article by Qaddurah Musa: "How Strange Not To Know Janin District!"]

[Excerpts] Janin—The City of Janin and its district are now preparing to greet Chamber of Commerce elections after an absence of nearly two decades. AL-FAJR considers this a suitable time to focus on Janin District so that citizens who do not know this district may learn its real importance in terms of its population, which is one-fifth of the population of the West Bank, and its land area, which is one-fifth of the land area of the West Bank. Naturally, these characteristics are reflected in a large number of Chamber members in comparison with other districts that have preceded Janin with their elections. It is natural and not surprising that there should be so many when one speaks of the district of Janin.

### Janin City

The City of Janin lies in the far north of the West Bank and overlooks the plain of Marj Ibn 'Amir. The Janin region is considered an important agricultural region of the West Bank. It is renowned for raising vegetables, fruits, and other tree crops.

The area of Janin City is about 581,230 dunams. A cultivated area of about 372,657 dunams is planted in various crops: tree crops, fruits, vegetables, and field crops such as wheat, barley, and chick-peas. There are 60 water wells in the Janin region, pumping a total of 226 cubic meters per hour.



Besides agriculture, there are some large and small factories in the city. The City of Janin also bustles with commercial activity because of its geographical location as a meeting place with the people of northern Palestine.

The city's population is about 32,175 people. [passage omitted]

Janin District is divided administratively as follows:

- Five municipalities: Janin, Ya'bad, Qabatiyah, 'Arrabah, and Tubas;
- Twelve village councils: Silat al-Zahr, al-Yamun, Burqin, al-Silah al-Harithiyah, al-Jalamah, al-Zababidah, Kafr Ra'i, Jaba', al-Funduqumiyah, Sir, 'Anza, and 'Ajjah;
- Remaining populated sites with either a headman or a projects committee.

Population distribution of Janin district:

- Six localities with populations of more than 10,000: Janin City, Janin Camp, Ya'bad, Tubas, Qabatiyah, and al-Yamun;
- Fifteen localities with populations between 3,000 and 10,000: Silah al-Harithiyah, Burqin, Dayr Abu Da'if, 'Ajjah, Sanur, Maythalun, 'Aqqaba, Silat al-Zahr, Jaba', Sir, Tammun, Kafr Ra'i, 'Arrabah, Barta'ah, and al-Fari'ah camp;
- Thirty-six localities with populations under 1,000.

Sources of electricity in Janin district:

- Israeli national electricity: Janin City, Burqin, Faqu'ah, Barta'ah, Silat al-Zahr, al-Funduqumiyah, Jaba', Janin Camp, Sanur, al-Jalamah, 'Anza, 'Ajjah, and 'Anin;
- Village public electricity projects: Ya'bad, 'Arrabah, al-Yamun, Silat al-Harithiyah, Rummanah, (Kafirt), Kafr Ra'i, Qabatiyah, Maythalun, al-Zababidah, al-Judaydah, Sir, Tubas, 'Aqqaba, Tammun, al-Tayyibah, and Zububa;
- Small generators: the remaining populated places.

Sources of water in Janin district:

- Israeli national water: Janin City, Janin Camp, Burqin, Qabatiyah, Ya'bad, 'Arrabah, Silat al-Zahr, al-Jalamah, al-Zababidah, al-Funduqumiyah, al-Mughayyir, and Jalqamus;
- Artesian wells or local projects: Barta'ah, Ya'bad, Tubas, and al-Fari'ah;
- Rainwater collecting wells: the remaining populated places.

#### Agriculture in Janin District

Janin district contains approximately 581,230 dunams, including over 410,000 dunams planted as follows:

- Olives, 150,000 dunams;
- Almonds, 28,000 dunams;
- Unirrigated cultivation, 170,000 dunams;
- Irrigated vegetables, 12,000 dunams;
- Forests, 50,000 dunams.

Livestock in Janin district:

- Cattle, 2,000;
- Sheep, 46,000;
- Goats, 24,000;
- Poultry for meat, 3.5 million to 4 million produced a year;
- Laying hens, 45,000, producing 10 million eggs a year.

#### Report Gives History, Details on Busaysu Murder

93AE0023A *Lor. n AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 30 Sep 92 pp 37-39*

[Article: "Yugoslavs First To Know Busaysu Added to Israel's Liquidation List"]

[Text] A Tunisian newspaper once said that former Tunisian intelligence chief Ahmed Ben Nour exploited his friendship with the Palestinian official 'Atif Busaysu and lured Busaysu to Paris, where he fell into the net of Israeli intelligence. Ben Nour completely denied the charge, calling it an attempt to defame his reputation and harm him.

Regardless of this charge, the fact is that Ben Nour, by virtue of his former job as chief of Tunisian security, had established a relationship with former Palestinian security official Salah Khalaf (Abu-Iyad). This relationship later developed to embrace all the senior Palestinian intelligence officials, including 'Atif Busaysu, who was assassinated in Paris early (this) June.

As is well-known, Ben Nour at the beginning of the 1980's was one of those considered to be a decision-maker in Tunisia, but he lost his position as public security chief in the wake of the 1984 "bread revolution" and was named his country's ambassador in Rome. He soon lost that job after being accused of misusing public funds, and he moved to live permanently in Paris.

#### Opening the File

Now that this file has been reopened, who was it who killed 'Atif Busaysu? What is the missing link in this thorny, complex case?

AL-MAJALLAH has made broad investigations, contacting a number of Palestinian officials, and has been able to uncover an important link in the long chain. The link involves the seeking of asylum by 'Atif Abu-Bakr, who for five years held the position of number-two man in the Fatah-Revolutionary Council movement led by Sabri al-Banna (Abu-Nidal). This movement, which is accused of a number of overseas operations, split from its mother organization, Fatah, in the second half of the 1970's and has been involved with it in a war of bloody killings from that time to the present.

Abu-Bakr, who before he left the Revolutionary Council—which is viewed in the West as unquestionably the most

dangerous of the Palestinian organizations—held the post of spokesman for the organization. He joined the Palestinian resistance early, before the June 1967 defeat. At first he enrolled in Damascus University. Then he went to Iraq, where he graduated from one of the faculties of the Iraqi university. In Damascus and in Baghdad, Abu-Bakr stood out as active in the General Union of Palestinian Students. He was chosen as a member of its executive body at the beginning of the 1970's. In Iraq, because he was a member of Fatah and a leader of the Palestinian student movement, he became a protege of Sabri al-Banna (Abu-Nidal), who at the time was in charge of the offices of Fatah and the PLO in the Iraqi capital, following his transfer from the Sudan in the wake of the well-known Khartoum operation.

People familiar with the realities of the Palestinian scene say that a disagreement developed between Abu-Nidal and Abu-Bakr in the mid-1970's while the two were in Baghdad. The reasons were political and had to do with their position on a peaceful settlement. Abu-Bakr favored a bloc within Fatah led by former Central Committee member Majid Abu-Sharar, who was assassinated in Rome in October 1981. The bloc supported the trend toward negotiations that the PLO followed after the October 1974 war.

#### Points of View

Because Abu-Bakr could not continue to remain beside Abu-Nidal due to the difference in their points of view on peaceful solutions and their ongoing arguments, he was appointed to head the PLO office in Prague, Czechoslovakia. About five years later he was transferred to become director of the PLO office in Budapest, Hungary.

Some people charge that Abu-Bakr maintained some sort of relationship with Abu-Nidal despite the latter's split from Fatah and the PLO at the end of the second half of the 1970's and his entry into a bloody struggle with the Palestinian security apparatus—a struggle that claimed as its victims a large number of PLO cadres and leaders, including 'Izz-al-Din al-Qalaq in Paris, Sa'id Hammami in London, and Abu-'Ali Yasin in Kuwait.

One version of the story is that Salah Khalaf (Abu-Iyad) was visiting Hungary at the end of the 1970's. Fearing for security reasons to stay in the hotel, he chose to stay at the home of the then director of the PLO's Budapest office, 'Atif Abu-Bakr. He learned about four years later that his archenemy Sabri al-Banna (Abu-Nidal) had been staying with him in the same house in the adjoining room.

In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon. A result of the invasion was the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut and the entire Lebanese south. In the spring of 1983, the well-known split took place in the Fatah movement, led by former Jordanian Army major Abu-Musa, who had joined the resistance after the events of September 1970. He was promoted subsequently to the rank of colonel and was chosen a member of the Revolutionary Council of Fatah at the movement's fourth conference in Damascus.

Because Sabri al-Banna's (Abu-Nidal's) conflict with the Fatah movement had reached a climax, he sided with the

split that Abu-Musa led and attempted to unite the organization with which he had broken away at the end of the 1970's with this new organization, which was the object of competition by many Palestinians and Arab countries.

Abu-Bakr, in the meantime, had announced his own split from the PLO and left Budapest for Damascus to join the new organization that Abu-Musa had formed in cooperation with Colonel Abu-Khalid al-'Amlah and others. However, after he arrived there, he was shocked by the reality of the new split. He contacted Abu-Nidal again and agreed with him that he would be the number-two man in the Fatah-Revolutionary Council movement and its official spokesman.

In this regard, many people, including Abu-Nidal himself, say that former Fatah Central Committee member Salah Khalaf (Abu-Iyad) was the man who induced 'Atif Abu-Bakr to split (from the PLO) in the first place. He then assigned him to join the Fatah-Revolutionary Council movement, so that he might be a "time bomb" that exploded at the right moment in the heart of the movement.

Abu-Bakr, who was very astute politically and was on friendly terms with many second- and third-rank leaders on the Palestinian scene by virtue of his former position as a leader of the General Union of Palestinian Students and his having headed two essential offices in Eastern Europe (Prague and Budapest), was able to line up a large number of Palestinian cadres. He was able to turn Fatah-Revolutionary Council from a secret marginal movement into one of the main groups of the Palestinian opposition.

During this time, especially after Fatah-Revolutionary Council moved its headquarters from Damascus to Libya, Abu-Bakr was able to gain favor with the later martyred Palestinian leader Khalil al-Wazir (Abu-Jihad). The relation between the two developed so much that this organization took part, albeit indirectly, in the National Council unity session held in Algiers in the spring of 1987.

#### 'Atif and 'Atif

During this session, which the Abu-Nidal organization attended as a result of pressure that Libyan Colonel Mu'amar al-Qadhafi exerted directly on the PLO, Abu-Bakr tried to turn the Fatah-Revolutionary Council movement from a secret organization feared by many into one of the groups of the PLO. His efforts failed. Although PLO's leaders, under Algerian and Libyan pressure, agreed to talk to the leaders of the organization, they imposed harsh conditions. The movement would have to remain outside the framework of Palestinian legitimacy, particularly because [the PLO], on the threshold of a new phase, was striving to prove that it was not a "terrorist organization."

During the days of the 1987 PNC session, Abu-Bakr was eager to arrange a meeting between Abu-Iyad and Abu-Nidal. The latter at first refused, but later agreed. The two archenemies met in a villa adjoining the conference hall in the Sidi Ferruch district about 20 km west of the Algerian



capital, in a stormy atmosphere at first marked by recrimination. Soon, however, agreement was reached on the need to coordinate efforts and divide up roles in order to confront the demands of the coming difficult period.

Because what was between the two men was more massive than the Aures Mountains, it was agreed to halt the ongoing war between them. Abu-Bakr and 'Atif Busaysu were commissioned to continue the work of reconciling viewpoints and resolving all outstanding problems. They were also to resolve any problems that might emerge between the two men in later phases—phases of political solutions and radical changes in the area of the Palestinian cause.

It appears that relations between Abu-Nidal and Abu-Bakr during this period became lukewarm. Abu-Bakr began looking for external alliances to bolster his internal position in the organization whose leaders had fallen into disagreement overnight in the wake of his split from the mother organization and his abandonment of his position in the PLO.

According to some Palestinian sources, Abu-Bakr, by way of his protege and right-hand man Busaysu, began sending Abu-Iyad full information about the conflicts that had erupted at the end of the 1980's inside the Fatah-Revolutionary Council movement. These conflicts had led to hundreds of liquidations between the two main sides in the movement, especially on the Palestinian scene.

After this conflict led to the liquidation of Abu-Nizar, one of the powerful men in Fatah-Revolutionary Council, after he was charged with having met Abu-Iyad in Algiers and having agreed with him to get rid of Abu-Nidal, Abu-Bakr began resolving to create a split within the movement in coordination with the PLO through 'Atif Busaysu.

The right moment came at the end of 1989. Abu-Bakr secretly left Libya and moved to a nearby Arab country with the supervision, knowledge, and arranging of 'Atif Busaysu, who was in charge of arranging these matters with the knowledge of Abu-Iyad. The latter seems to have made a final decision to aim a mortal blow at the Fatah-Revolutionary Council movement, which constituted a permanent headache to the mother organization and to all Palestinian activity.

In addition to trying to fragment this organization, especially in Lebanon where it had its main presence, some information mentions that Abu-Iyad—naturally, through Busaysu, who was responsible for external relations in Palestinian intelligence—transmitted to Western intelligence agencies (the French in particular) a flood of information that he had obtained through Abu-Bakr about Revolutionary Council cells in a number of European countries. These cells had carried out a series of attacks on airports and civilian targets and were preparing for similar operations as political steps progressed toward finding a solution to the Middle East crisis.

Many think that for the Europeans, Abu-Bakr was "the goose that laid the golden eggs" and that he provided them

with invaluable information not only about the Fatah-Revolutionary Council movement, but also about all the violent European revolutionary movements—Italian, Belgian, and German—and about similar movements connected with Iran.

To repay the favor, the French apparatus welcomed Abu-Bakr as a political refugee on French soil after the assassination of Abu-Iyad, who had been providing Abu-Bakr with protection and shielding him from the reach of Abu-Nidal, who was pursuing him on the charge that he had defected and had become a PLO "collaborator."

In France, the pampered refugee began to reveal to French intelligence all his old and new cards. One of his revelations was that Busaysu had participated in the infamous Munich operation in the early 1970's. His job was to prepare the fake passports on which the executors of the operation traveled to West Germany.

The pampered refugee also revealed to his hosts that Busaysu was in charge of external relations in Palestinian intelligence and that he had been able to establish certain relations with the CIA through a friend of his in Paris who was a citizen of one of the Arab states and had extensive relations with circles in the American apparatus.

According to some sources, this information reached Israeli intelligence (Mosad) through certain penetrations in the French security apparatus. Mosad put Busaysu on the liquidation list to block any serious security relations between the PLO and the American apparatus and to avenge the Israelis killed in the Munich operation.

#### Yugoslav Warnings

According to these sources, Yugoslav intelligence was the first to learn that Israeli intelligence had put Busaysu on the liquidation list. The Yugoslavs informed Palestinian intelligence. They asked the Palestinians to stop the visit that the official had begun to certain European countries and have him return immediately to his base of operations in Tunis.

Because Busaysu had already arrived in Germany, the relevant agencies contacted German security channels. The latter confirmed to them the Yugoslav intelligence information, expressed readiness to protect the Palestinian official as long as he was on their territory but did not guarantee his safety if he moved to any other European or non-European country.

It is certain that this information was passed to Busaysu. Palestinian officials asked him to cut short his mission and return to Tunis immediately, but he insisted not only on going to France, but on going by land. Particular talks are said to have been the reason for his going to France, but no information has been uncovered as to whether these talks were to be with French intelligence or with other parties in contact with Israeli intelligence.

On this particular point, the aforementioned Tunisian newspaper has said that Ahmed Ben Nour was on the other

side of the talks and that it was he who lured the deputy Palestinian security commissioner to Paris so that he might fall into the net of Israeli intelligence. Ben Nour has denied this charge completely and has stated that he never saw Busaysu or talked to him after the latter left Tunisia in 1984, even though Busaysu was considered a close friend of his.

In any case, Busaysu arrived in Paris from Germany overland on 7 June (this) year. He stayed at the Hotel Montparnasse Parc, which Palestinians used to frequent in the mid-1980's, and was scheduled to hold a working meeting with French intelligence the next day.

That evening, the deputy Palestinian security commissioner went to dine in a French restaurant with a Lebanese journalist who had been his friend since his Lebanon days and whom he had been meeting regularly in Tunis over the years. The two were accompanied by a young woman said to have been the Lebanese journalist's friend or wife. The journalist was working for an American television station as a public relations coordinator and expert on Palestinian and Middle East affairs. Busaysu, with his security sense and in light of the information he had received in Germany, noticed unusual movement around him in the restaurant. He told his Lebanese journalist friend about it; the latter (so he has said) telephoned French intelligence and told them that the Palestinian official was in danger and that they would have to take responsibility for protecting him immediately. The answer (again according to his version of the story) was that it was the weekend, that there was no cause for alarm or fear, and that the meeting with the deputy Palestinian security commissioner would take place the next day at the scheduled time.

Busaysu quickly left the restaurant with his Lebanese companion. They immediately headed in the friend's car (he seated his girl friend or wife in the back seat) to Hotel Montparnasse Parc without delay. When they arrived at the door of the hotel, the Palestinian official got out and approached the rear door of the car to open it for the young woman, so that she might change seats and sit beside her husband or friend in the front seat.

At that moment, two men got out of a car that had stopped in front of the hotel before the arrival of the Palestinian official. They headed at once toward Busaysu. One of them pushed him toward the car, placing his right arm at the level of his chest, while the other man fired several bullets at his head with a silenced pistol fitted with a plastic bag to keep the spent shells, so as not to leave any trace at the scene of the crime.

Busaysu died immediately, joining a long line of his colleagues with whom he had worked for many years and who had been assassinated in various and sundry places. But with his assassination he left perplexing questions: Did Israeli intelligence assassinate him? Did the information that Abu-Bakr provided guide the bullets of treachery to his head? Did his Lebanese journalist friend telephone French intelligence to ask for their protection? Did this Palestinian official really fall victim to collusion between

French intelligence and Israel? These are questions that will remain in need of answers until the facts are uncovered and the dust is shaken off the old file.

### Editorial Discounts Opposition to Negotiations

93AE0016B Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH  
in Arabic 27 Sep 92 pp 8, 9

[Article by Ahmad 'Abd-al-Haq: "Those Who Would Quit the Match After the Opening Shot: And Your Eyes Shall Be to the Left of Your Reflection?"]

[Excerpts] Israelis opposed to a peaceful settlement consist of the nationalist right, the religious movement, and fanatic settlers. The Palestinian opposition to a settlement is composed of the left, the nationalist left, and the fundamentalist movement. [passage omitted]

In Israel, Ariel Sharon is leading a new movement called "One Israel" that defends settlements and "resists" any possible relinquishing of occupied territories. It is widely known that it was Sharon who ordered the army of occupation to destroy the Yamit settlement in the former Sinai-al-Hadath following the Camp David agreements. In the Palestinian case, the political forces that devastated Lebanese camps and dispatched their residents in Lebanon and in the region to the frosty new northern exiles of Europe—these forces are advocating strikes in the defense of the right of return, even though the Rabin government will not abandon his predecessor Shamir's policies towards basic issues. The Palestinian political address did not cede the right of return, nor did our negotiating team abandon the tenets of the Palestinian question, especially those dealing with Jerusalem and repatriation. Rumored developments at the recent session of bilateral talks are nothing but tactical maneuvers performed by the parties concerned in order to make a breakthrough, if possible, or to feel around for some way to make inroads in the conflict between the two poles of the struggle.

A simplistic question that poses itself here is why it would be acceptable for the Israelis to maneuver, when any maneuvering on our part is considered selling out, seceding rights, etc.?

Let us contemplate the Rabin government's conduct over the past few weeks, which some Israelis summarize as based on statements by senior officials regarding Tel Aviv's wide-scale preparations for peace and on taking long and important steps towards its realization. But no serious change is discerned at the negotiating table, and the negotiators must intimate that agreement is close at hand. The actual end-result in Washington is practically nil, and that is the real gauge.

The Israelis have accomplished important information breakthroughs in indicating, or giving the illusion, that their new government has adopted an extremely flexible position in comparison with Shamir's government. In other words, they attempted through propaganda, and partially succeeded, in obscuring the real standard here, which is that flexibility is measured by the extent to which

the Rabin government has moved closer to the essence of the current and agreed-upon political process, i.e. UN resolutions rather than the positions of the Shamir government. Our main task is therefore to refute this false logic, perhaps through reformulating our negotiating stance. No "free concessions" as Palestinian negotiators constantly say.

Withdrawing the Palestinian delegation at this time when the serious round has just begun is analogous to pulling back from a football game once the opening whistle is blown. This being the case, we would have been better off rejecting the negotiations early on. In other words, those in the opposition should have worked to influence the vote of our recent National Council in order for it to come out against Palestinian participation in the talks, and not in favor of it, as it did.

It is quite astonishing that most Palestinian political forces, proponents and opponents alike, agree on their diagnosis of the preliminaries of this political process and on the general analysis of its implications. They even agree on most conclusions. Rather, their differences revolve around the ways and means of implementation and drive certain elements of the opposition to illogical and unreasonable lengths. This brings up a question about our opposition's adamancy on being comparable and a counterpart to today's Israeli opposition.[passage omitted]

Israeli opposition has its own platforms and alternatives [as it attempts] to force the government to retreat, and they are able to implement those alternatives within a foreseeable time frame that is not necessarily long, but this is not the issue. In the case of Palestine, on the other hand, what does the opposition propose we should do after we withdraw from the political process?

Let us say it in advance. It is not enough to hoist the slogan of nurturing and escalating the intifadah because developments have proven without a doubt that the main party to the political process is the most faithful advocate of that slogan. It is common knowledge that most of those who denounce the political process have no notable presence inside the occupied fatherland. No Palestinian would buy the arguments of those who made negative contributions to the battle for an independent national Palestinian position or of those who maintained a suspicious silence then raise their voices today to demand immediate national independence and accuse veterans of the primary battle of relinquishing that tenet of Palestinian rights.

Rabin and his government today are waging a battle with the same weapon with which we successfully fought the government of his predecessor Rabin. Is it appropriate, then, for the Palestinian opposition to destroy one of the sources of strength for our delegation to the negotiations? In fact, there are dozens of issues to be used as weapons, if the Palestinian opposition so wished and if it perfected its targeted patriotic role. It is not our intention here to preach put to point out the general course of events.

Facing up to this task, in our estimation, requires first of all that the opposition give up their outmoded logic of

times past, when the techniques used for recruiting and organizing by most opposition groups were not rooted in powerful and cohesive platforms but in appearing to look better by distorting and misrepresenting the positions of others.

### Article Profiles al-Zarqa' Camp Problems, Aid Figures

93AE0013A Amman AL-LIWA' in Arabic 17 Sep 92  
pp 4, 22

[Article by Samir al-Hajawi: "Al-Zarqa' Camp, Steadfastness in the Face of Time"]

[Excerpts] In the dirt roads and narrow alleys of al-Zarqa' Camp, you can smell the scents of Jaffa, Haifa, Baysan, Gaza, Nabulus, and Jerusalem. You walk along roads, and it is as if a song is ringing out: "We shall return, no matter how long!"

It does not matter what is going on in the place. One of them talks to you about his village or town, as if he could see it. He talks to you about every small or large thing in the most accurate detail. He says: "40 years of separation from the beloved nation, but we have not forgotten our land and villages, their streets and threshing floors. We know them better than our children. We have not forgotten our homes, whose keys we still have." Can a people be defeated who hold on to these thoughts, deep within the minds of their sons? Two dilapidated rooms in which 18 people live. How can life go on, when the owner of the house, Husni al-'Atal, works as an itinerant vendor. Here the mother whispers about life. Yesterday her children went to bed without food. A small child jumped up, one of her children who crowded around us saying: "Tomorrow, we will be bigger." Yes, tomorrow they will be bigger. How will they like a world that has treated them like this, cramming them into two rooms, fit only for a grave?

According to UN Relief and Works Agency [UNRWA] statistics, 15,481 refugees live in the camp. I do not know if, to some people, the word "refugee" means one human being or a hundred with a stay of execution. The area of the camp measures 1.8 km, which gives it the highest population density in the world.

Piles of garbage greet visitors to the camp. The camp was built after the 1948 defeat and the expulsion of the Palestinian people. When you enter it, you see faces with challenging expressions, despite the poverty, suffering, and misfortunes of life. You look at those faces upon which the sun shines, and their beauty increases. Their eyes are filled with questions and perplexity.

In order to investigate the conditions of camp residents, who live in houses much like packing crates—located on narrow alleys through which symphonies of pain and hope echo as if they were telling the Palestinian dream of returning, which braves the rust of time—and, in order to learn firsthand their demands and views pertaining to life in the camp, we made several trips over a period of several



days to all parts of the camp. We visited everyone who could help us carry out this investigation in the best way possible.

#### **International Community Obligated to Find Solution**

According to data obtained from a document published by the UNRWA media office, there are 10 camps in Jordan under UNRWA supervision (in fact, there are 13 camps, of which UNRWA recognizes 10). According to the statement of Matar Saqr, UNRWA's spokesman in Jordan, the camp is a piece of territory that the host nation placed under UNRWA's control to shelter Palestinian refugees. He added that there is a definition for a refugee and for an emigrant. A refugee is any person who lived in Palestine before 1948, lost his source of livelihood, needed assistance, and registered with UNRWA. This person and his children are classified as refugees. An emigrant is someone who left one place for another within the boundaries of the country. Therefore, an emigrant is the direct responsibility of the Jordanian Government.

Matar Saqr said that UNRWA is, at the same time, a symbol. As long as the blue flag continues to fly, it means that a problem exists. It means that the international community has failed to find a solution to the Palestinian issue and, on the other hand, the international community is obligated to find a solution.

Concerning the camps' ability to absorb more residents, Matar Saqr said: "Camps are pushing people out. According to statistics, there are no more than 25 percent of those registered with the agency, while 75 percent live outside the camps."

With regard to the jobs that UNRWA performs, Matar Saqr said: "I would like to point out that the agency offers its services according to available resources. It allocates 66 percent of its budget for compulsory education up to 10th grade, 33 percent for health, and 10 percent for aid and cases of extreme hardship." According to agency data, al-Zarqa' Camp was built in 1949, after the 1948 war. It is the oldest camp in Jordan sheltering Palestinian refugees who were forced to leave Palestine. Nearly 750,000 Palestinians sought refuge in neighboring Arab countries. They were mostly small landowners, farmers, and workers. Those who came to Jordan lived, at first, in mosques and schools."

Al-Zarqa' Camp is the oldest in Jordan. It was established by the Red Cross on land totaling 180,000 square meters, southeast of al-Zarqa', 20 km northeast of Amman. At first, 8,000 refugees lived there in tents, which were later replaced by cement barracks. With the passage of time, the refugees improved their quarters by self-initiative, adding rooms to them. Now, the camp has become a part of the City of al-Zarqa' because it is like the surrounding areas. Its population totaled 15,481 on 1 January 1992.

#### **Camp Mukhtar**

Mahmud Mustafa al-Sharbini, the mukhtar of Baysan, is one of the camp's notables. He said: "As you see, these

houses are not fit to live in under any situation. Eleven persons live in this three-room house. One road has needed paving for four years (Mutaradah). This is enough to know the extent of suffering." Concerning the camp's poor, the mukhtar said: "There are more than 300 families living below the poverty line. For example, they are unable to pay sewage fees or the cost of medical treatment, not even medical examinations." Al-Sharbini pointed out that the clinic does not satisfy the needs of the camp population. (According to a document published by UNRWA, four doctors deal with 990 cases daily!).

As for water, the mukhtar said that the water network was worn out. It was constructed in 1952, and, since then, the water system has not been changed. Al-Sharbini referred to the electricity lines. He said that they were very close to the houses and were a menace to human life. He demanded that officials remove them from their present location.

Al-Sharbini stressed the question of building second floors and vertical expansion in construction. He pointed out that the number of family members has been increasing, but income has remained approximately fixed. This does not allow them to leave the camp to build outside of it, which causes hardship in the lives of these people.

Concerning deputies and their promises, al-Sharbini stated: "Their promises come borne on the winds. Not one of those notables came to this house (the mukhtar's house). After the elections, we no longer saw any of them."

#### **Camp Improvement Committee**

Dr. 'Abd-al-Latif al-Sharbini, a member of the camp improvement committee, said: "We have encountered many obstacles with responsible officials. We have sent them many requests through official letters, but we have not had any encouragement for vertical expansion, nor permission to build. They have always stated frankly to us that the reason for rejection is political. I would like to point out that the committee is a volunteer group, whose job is to convey the people's requests to officials. It has no authority or powers."

With regard to the cemetery, Dr. 'Abd-al-Latif said: "Seven months ago, the wall was destroyed. People spread their washing on the graves. We have spoken with all of the responsible quarters, but there has been no response."

#### **Imam of al-Qasam Mosque**

Shaykh Abu Ziyad [al-Qitnani], imam of al-Qasam Mosque and a member of the camp's al-Zakat [Charity] Committee, stated: "The camp's population is nearly 20,000. Poor families total 300, and some of these families have incomes of less than 30 or 40 [Jordanian] dinars per month."

Concerning the clinic, Shaykh al-Qitnani said: "The clinic belongs to the Islamic Relief Organization and was virtually free, until the doctors' union put pressure on certain doctors of al-Zarqa'. The clinic's examination fee is now two dinars. The poor person pays that fee and cannot

[afford] medicine because, in the past, the patient paid one-half dinar and, many times, paid nothing."

Talking about the camp improvement committee, Shaykh al-Qitnani said that its job was to pave the streets, with the help of the state and UNRWA, and to provide lighting and sewage services. However, unfortunately, it has not met in five months because the camp improvement committee's chairman, Ishaq Shahin, is trying to work on his own. Regarding the camp improvement committee's source of financing, Shaykh al-Qitnani said: "One-fourth of a dinar paid on electricity bills goes for the committee's benefit, in addition to the subsidies." Regarding vendors (carpet merchants), he said that "there was dialogue between the municipality and the railway board to obtain a piece of land for them." However, it is clear that the railway board did not agree, which forced these vendors to withdraw inside the camp. We saw them with our own eyes, when they gathered among the houses. The shaykh said that the municipality set aside a poor location for them, with not much traffic through it. Regarding the situation of the cemetery, the shaykh said that this situation is unsettled. It is a nest of moral problems, and he called for the need to acquire a piece of land to use as a cemetery (such as a piece of the businesses along the autostrada), because the people want to avoid the tragedies of death and bury the dead away from themselves. As for the use of the Hashemite cemetery, the shaykh said: "It costs a great deal for these people. Some of them do not even have the price of the shroud. People are suffering from cramped housing, not being allowed to build vertically, so that families can expand. We are suffering from the problem of scoundrels gathering in the cemetery and in front of girls' schools." He said that the solution lies in police patrols to prevent that.

Regarding al-Zakat committees, Shaykh al-Qitnani said: "These committees give material assistance, supplies, and food provided by [al-Muhasanayn], the Charitable Works Board, the Islamic Relief Organization, and the Green Crescent."

#### The Club

One of the officials at the club said that the club's land and building is leased from the Association of Christian Youth. "We pay 500 dinars a year. I am not revealing any secret if I say that the material condition is very bad. Despite that, we provide aid to 117 families, financed by al-Muhasanayn." He said that the club used to participate in 11 federations, but, because of the shortfall in material resources, "we only participate in three federations today. They are volleyball, football, and weight lifting. He said: "There was land set aside for the club, but the municipality seized it so that a road to the new parking lot could be built. Our compensation was another piece of land, but it is unsuitable because it is a wadi." [passage omitted].

#### The Medical Clinic

In the Islamic Relief Organization's medical clinic, we talked with Dr. Salah al-'Abbudi, who said: "The clinic is

really two clinics, a general medical clinic and a women's clinic, in addition to a laboratory."

He said that services were provided to 50 to 60 patients a day. This service is free for the poor, orphans, and the needy. Medicine is also given free, and lab services are free for orphans. Routine examinations are available, but other examinations are not provided. Dr. al-'Abbudi added: "We offer all possible services, necessary tests, and available treatment. These are given free to orphans and the poor." As for the number of staff, Dr. al-'Abbudi said: "Seven people work in the clinic: three doctors, two nurses, a lab technician, and a clerk."

#### Mayor of al-Zarqa'

Yasir al-'Amri, the mayor of al-Zarqa', spoke to us: "Al-Zarqa' Camp does not belong to the municipality. It is outside municipality limits, but we give assistance, if required, to the camp improvement committee." [passage omitted]

#### Office of Palestinian Affairs

Over the phone, we talked with Ihsan al-Bustami, director of UNRWA's Office of Palestinian Affairs. We asked him about the reason that the camp residents are forbidden to build vertically. He said that state policy prevented the building of second stories in camps. When we told him that camp residents had an urgent need for this construction because of increased numbers of family members, he replied: "They made their situation."

We should point out that a policeman (we will refrain from mentioning his name) stated that immediately after a problem occurred at the camp, he wanted to close the camp. He said that one of the captains (whose name we will not mention) said: "Your democracy. Why should a group insult one of the camp's notables? We do not believe that officials will accept such matters occurring at a time when our country is experiencing increased democratic liberalization and freedom." [passage omitted]

## EGYPT

#### U.S. Blamed for World's Tragedies

93AF0021A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 3 Sept 92 p 7

[Article by Dr. Muhammad 'Asfur: "Future of Humanity in the American Era"]

[Text] It is an undeniable fact that from now on we will be living the American era. Nobody can tell for sure approximately when will it end, although Fokoyama (the Japanese-American writer) published a book in which he alleged that democratic capitalism is the end of history. In other words, political thought and the social system will forever be determined within the framework of the American political, social, and philosophical system. Although many voices disagree with this view, pointing to its exaggeration and bias, and consider it to be some kind of intelligence disinformation, other voices go to the other



extreme, saying that the American empire, like all other empires, is historically predestined for collapse or disintegration as a result of disequilibrium between military power and economic power. Other thinkers predict this tragic fate because of internal decay and the corruption and injustice that accompany it.

A few studies about the future of humanity have emerged since the collapse and dismemberment of the Soviet Union. Perhaps the first of these in the Arab world is a study by Dr. Samir Amin titled *Certain Future Issues—Reflections on the Challenges of the Contemporary World*. The 374-page study comes to the conclusion that the contemporary world needs to be reconstructed on the basis of recognizing the principle that pluralism has a popular, although not socialist, nationalist context found at state, national, or regional levels. This pluralism is the only way to enable the development of critical thought that rejects dogmatism, that is, ideology in its various forms. Imposing liberal rhetoric as a solution for the contemporary world crisis would incite reasonable reactions that find expression in racial, national, or religious fanaticism of all sorts. The writer believes that "the new liberalism that is intended to be imposed is simply parochial, anachronistic, and seriously reactionary." Yet the writer admits that we will continue to live for some time in a world that will continue to be characterized by a military duet until it is recognized that conditions differ in different parts of our world, which would enable going beyond just simple "peaceful coexistence," replacing it with a stronger rhetoric that is compatible with the need to recognize the world unity and establish its legitimacy on strong basis. Can Dr. Samir Amin's wishes be realized "so that the hegemony of the bourgeoisie with intermediary characteristics that impede production development will end" and the Third World countries will be given the chance to move and to advance when their foreign relations are subjected to the needs of their internal development, instead of these countries adapting their economies to suit the interests of the capitalist forces, regardless of their order of precedence? (pp 271-274)

I would not be unfair to our Arab thinker if I characterize his proposals or development project as an indulgence in fantasy, even if we take it as a prophecy. Therefore, I believe it is necessary to proceed from clear and established facts, that is, the absolute U.S. hegemony on all the world affairs, understanding the nature of this hegemony, how it originated, and whether in the near or distant future it will face any competition or whether it will retreat or shrink. The factors and elements that have contributed to the establishment of this hegemony and its perpetuation are deep-rooted pillars in the structure of the American nation and its national characteristic. It is inconceivable that the U.S. political leadership will abandon those qualities.

We should not look at these questions as insignificant or just theoretical suppositions that belong to the realm of academic research. Rather, they are vital issues that concern the fate of all of the peoples of the world, whether in powerful countries or Third World countries. Apparently all those who dealt with the future of the world did not start from the logical beginning, because this is not just a

study of the nature of the U.S. hegemony in the world, but also of the present U.S. role in all world problems, its role in tearing apart the former Soviet Union, and even in dismembering Europe or destroying it internally in different countries, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in creating hunger, sowing sedition, and starting wars in the African continent. While the West pretends to be trying to save the Somali people from dying of starvation, it is supplying the conflicting parties with weapons, the parties that turn into armed gangs that plunder most of the aid given to them.

With regard to our Arab World, the U.S. support for Israel that has been planted in the midst of our homeland has left the Zionist army with its U.S. arms free to destroy not only occupied Palestine, but also the areas that Israel invaded in Syria and Lebanon. Additionally, there is strong, deep-seated opposition to any Arab defensive armament to face the weapons of total destruction that Israel possesses and a strong U.S. insistence on partitioning Iraq under the pretext of protecting the Iraqi Shiites.

If we were to look for an explanation for these hostile attitudes, we would find that they originate in the puritanical and jingoistic upbringing that is hostile to every religion other than Christianity in its most extreme fanatic forms. The U.S. attitude toward the Asian continent and even toward Latin America is no less ferocious. Can this ferociousness be attributed to the racist outlook among the white Protestants who claim supremacy over lower peoples and colored races?

It is evident that these different examples have one thing in common, which is harshness and cruelty in dealing with the outside world. This harshness and cruelty is sometimes due to racism, other times to religious fanaticism, and yet other times to selfish considerations and the quest for profit and wealth, even if this leads to wars and sedition. The aim is to arm client countries so that bread can be taken away from the mouths of the starving peoples in order to pay for arms. We see no place here to discuss the origins of this bloody characteristic of the American nation since the days when the British colonies became an independent country. The country then became an empire founded on invasion and buying off heads of state and kings so that they would sell out their countries, or a part of them. We will discuss this subject later because it deals with the illegal methods by which the expansionist United States was established. We would like to throw light on the methods that the United States adopts in order to implement its plans for weakening all of the countries that compete with it and those of the Third World.

#### Local Assemblies Viewed as Weak, Ineffective

93AF0021B Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 8 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Nasir Fayyad]

[Text] Local People's Assemblies are in a state of deep coma. The local authorities got lost in a maize of conflicting legislation and decisions. There has been a duplication of decisions issued by the executive authorities and

the local authorities. This picture is clearly evident in the Republic's governorates, where there are multiple legislative bodies. The directorates receive instructions from the central ministries in Cairo, and when the instructions are implemented, they must once again go through the local assemblies' doors. These doors have become worn out. Chairmen of specialized committees in major service ministries, such as Education, Transportation, Agriculture, Health, and others, know nothing about their specialization. In fact, some of them hold positions that are far from their specialization.

The local assemblies have distanced themselves from serving society and have become a hindrance to such service. They have disappeared from the people's midst, to the extent that young people know nothing about them. The local assemblies' laws have multiplied more than once, and so responsibility has been lost. According to the prerogatives of the local assemblies, their role is confined to participating in planning through specialized committees that set targets in light of the critical study of available resources. There is then the control function, which covers all of the activities, including the issuing of decisions in cooperation with the executive bodies concerned. The law empowers the local assemblies to issue decisions at the governorate level and to make these decision binding and obligatory. Assembly members have a right to attend committee meetings, take part in the debate, raise questions, and express views.

The assemblies were established somewhat in their present form in 1960, although their roots go back to the previous century in certain directorates, especially in Alexandria.

The question of the local assemblies' independence has been a problem from the time they were established, thus losing their constituencies, effectiveness, and ability to express themselves. The assemblies failed to coordinate between the popular bodies and the executive ones and failed to make quick decisions. In fact, the assemblies interfered in all matters relating to the ministries' instructions. This is evident in the governorates. We see the local assemblies' intervention with "obstructive" decisions, such as defining the number of those accepted at schools, the development of hospitals, and other such matters. It is odd that services relating to the ministries are left to be decided upon by the assemblies at a time assembly chairmen have no experience in the field of their specialty. It is easy to find a "merchant" who has been appointed chairman of a transportation and communications committee, a teacher who is chairman of an agriculture committee, and an employee who is chairman of the education committee. Thus a gap has been created between the ministries and the local assemblies in the governorates, thereby causing a disruption in serving the people's interests.

A recent study prepared by Cairo Governorate on the state of affairs in the local assemblies called for the need to standardize laws, coordinate between the executive and the popular bodies, intervene quickly in order to solve the problems that affect the people, maintain the independence of governorates in implementing decisions, redefine

relations between the executive bodies and the Local Assemblies, set up specialized executive committees on all the local levels, and enable the citizens and the assemblies' representatives to study their needs and submit them in full. The study warns against Articles 9, 10, and 11 of Section 2, Chapter 1, which permits the governor to intervene in a manner that would adversely affect making decisions in the citizen's interest.

'Ali al-Imam, former chairman of the Local Assembly for Cairo Governorate, said the local government law is considered a step toward democracy. The Assembly should exploit this advantage when issuing decisions. Although the local government law is recent, practice has generated a number of amended laws and regulations, causing confusion of responsibilities and contradictory decisions to be issued. We find this confusion in the service ministries. Sovereignty ministries, such as Defense and Foreign Affairs, have nothing to do with the local assemblies.

The local government law grants limited powers in issuing decisions in light of the plan approved by the central authority. The local assemblies cannot deviate from the plan. Therefore, the decisions issued are not contradictory with the state's general policy and the endorsed budget. Assembly members have a right to participate in implementing it based on the submitted data.

With regard to the contradictory decisions issued by the central ministries and the local assemblies and the interference by local assemblies in the jurisdictions of certain ministries, such as defining enrollment grades in the various educational stages, the assemblies' law provides that decisions should come after a careful study by the committees concerned and should be consistent with the state's higher policies.

Dr. Mahmud al-Saqqa, head of the department of the philosophy of law at Cairo Law Faculty and a member of the higher committee of the al-Wafd Party, says that there is no plan to organize the local assemblies' work and so the operation has become a haphazard affair. The governor and the executive bodies, along with the local assemblies, interfere in order to define the ministries' prerogatives in the governorates and often issue duplicate decisions because of poor administration and planning. The directorates have one view, the governorates a second view, and the local assemblies a third. Strangely, the local assemblies' discussions deal with superficial matters, rather than with the core of the matter. It has become necessary to review the local administration law and the central system in Cairo. It has transpired that centralized decision-making and taking away power from the local administration have proved the failure of the experiment.

AL-WAFD has followed some of the meetings of al-Daqahliyah Local Assembly. This has shown that the Assembly interferes with the directorates' policies on health, education, transportation, agriculture, irrigation, and others. We asked Fathi Salamah, deputy minister of education in al-Daqahliyah, about the nature of relations

between the Local Assembly and the Education Directorate. He said there are certain areas of understanding. Decisions are often issued after further consultations and discussions are carried out, on the grounds that the local assemblies share the responsibility. With regard to chairmen of the specialized committees, they are chosen for the appropriate post on the basis of their specialization. For example, it is inconceivable that the education committee could be headed by a person who is not an educator.

AL-WAFD met with Major General Sa'd al-Sharbin, chairman of local administration in the People's Assembly. He said that the current local government law needs to be studied and amended with regard to the question of extreme centralization and there needs to be an amendment that would strengthen the independence of the local districts in making the proper decisions and take into consideration the special conditions in the districts. With regard to coordination between the local bodies and the executive bodies in any governorate, it is natural that discussion should take place between them before decisions are made. And since the deputy prime minister or the ministry's representative are members of the local assembly, a decision should be thoroughly discussed before it is issued. Generally, the local assemblies' decisions are no more than recommendations that may or may not be adopted.

### **Saddam, Totalitarianism Seen as Regional Scourge**

93AF0021C Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 7 Sep 92 p 4

[Article by Counselor Sharif Kamil: "Saddam: A Calamity for Iraq"]

[Text] The fact that Saddam Husayn is a historic calamity, a definite scourge, and a sure catastrophe that has befallen Iraq and dealt it a fatal blow has provoked important ideas and repercussions that help in the analysis and understanding of all the conditions on which regimes in the entire Arab area based.

In our previous article, we came to a political and social conclusion of great importance and grave danger, namely that the special historic conditions that the "Islamic" Middle East area has experienced for more than 14 centuries has led to most of the states in this area consisting of many and varied mixtures of peoples and of different races, ethnicities, sects, religions, social classes, and creeds. This has created differences about interests and objectives. This has also resulted in the meaning of "one people" having "one public will" becoming nonexistent. The actual situation in the area shows that there are different peoples and even conflicting peoples within one state. This is what we called in our previous article "haphazard human gathering." As a consequence, for peoples in most of the Arab area, the expression "public will" has lost its meaning. It has been replaced by the expression "will of the ruling regime." Those regimes have monopolized power and government and accumulated wealth and authority. In this respect, there is no difference between regimes that claim

to be republics, that lie to everybody by posing as revolutionary, or royalist regimes in which the transfer of power takes place only by killing or through natural death. In this case, another regime comes to take its share of power, treading over the bodies and limbs of the previous regime so that it can monopolize power and wealth.

This is how political life has prevailed in all of the "Islamic" Arab countries for more than 14 centuries. We think that this kind of life will continue to exist for a long time in most of the countries of the area, regardless of the impact of the international changes and of the fall of the absolute dictatorship regimes, whether in Europe or in what used to be the Soviet Union. This type of political life in the Arab countries is one of the basic characteristics of the regimes that emerge in the area. It is perhaps one of the basic characteristics of political life in general in all the area. Scientifically and practically it has been proven that the basic and essential characteristics do not change. Even if they do change, they will need gigantic and comprehensive efforts over long periods of time that cannot be abbreviated or ignored. This is the fact that must be faced candidly and with realism, whether we are talking about Saddam Husayn or about the majority of rulers in the Arab world. The fact that regimes in this area directly monopolize power and all of the wealth cannot be denied or ignored. Indeed, it is politically and realistically beneficial to have the courage to recognize the existing situation (not recognizing its legality and legitimacy) to take the necessary realistic and practical steps, to plan or take realistic and practical steps toward this end in light of the existing situation, and not another, better situation that we imagine exists. In the latter case, such plans or steps would be indulging in harmful and useless fantasies. For example, realistic recognition that the Arab regimes monopolize power and all of the wealth and trappings of power as if it were a legitimate inheritance would probably help a great deal in trying to unravel the perplexing riddle of the whole Arab region, the riddle that should be considered one of the basic characteristics of Arab political life in the region in general. This riddle is perhaps represented in the following important question: If the Arab rulers, or most of them, are practically and realistically the private owners of the countries they are coincidentally ruling, why do all of these rulers tend to destroy their own property (their country), which, in the final analysis, harms them? This question is completely different from the question of the existence of the people or the people's real interests or other matters relating to the idea that the people are the real owner of the country and has sovereignty on its territory.

Logically, a ruler or a king should preserve the private property that he inherited by seizing power as if it were a legitimate inheritance from his parents. It is natural for a ruler or a king to preserve his private property that he inherited from a revolutionary regime or a republican regime or a monarchist regime, which seldom happens. In this regard, an extremely important observation, which has been corroborated by the prevailing political reality, must be clearly noted. This political observation is that most or



all the Arab regimes that are based on a monarchical system do not tend to destroy their countries. On the contrary, the fact is that Arab monarchies have actually realized great and tangible accomplishments, whether on the level of the citizen and the state or in trying to catch up in science, culture, and civilization. These monarchies include countries that have well-paying job opportunities, and for this reason, people from other Arab countries with revolutionary or republican regimes flock to them.

On the other hand, all of the revolutionary or republican Arab regimes, the most significant of which is, of course, Saddam Husayn's, always tend to destroy their countries with failed wars and haphazard decisions. This has caused the people to suffer from poverty, hunger, unemployment, and backwardness. As a result, the citizen has become downtrodden, and the state has become merely a vicious police state that kills men and openly plunders authority, without shame or embarrassment. So what is the explanation of this basic and important observation?

## JORDAN

### Islamic Action Front Registers With Ministry

93P400294

[Editorial Report] Jerusalem AL-NAHAR in Arabic of 10 October 1992 on page 3 reports that the Islamic Action Front party had presented its application for establishment to the Directorate of Party Affairs and Elections in the Interior Ministry on the morning of 9 October.

Dr. Ishaq al-Farhan, engineer Ra'if Najm, Dr. 'Abdallah al-'Akayilah, lawyer 'Abd-al-Majid al-Dhunaybat, and 'Abd-al-Latif al-Subayhi presented the party's application. The party has 312 founding members.

Ishaq al-Farhan, the party's temporary secretary general and official spokesman, said that the Islamic Action Front is administratively, financially, and organizationally independent.

On 3 October, several days before the party submitted its application, the Amman Arabic daily AL-DUSTUR ran a front-page article quoting spokesman al-Farhan as saying that "the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) will enter the elections via the party and will issue a newspaper in our name that may be [called] AL-RIBAT [the name of the current MB publication] or any other name."

AL-DUSTUR also quoted Ziyad Abu-Ghunaymah, who said that the MB is an association with comprehensive goals, and that the Islamic Action Front is for political activity, including members from outside the MB.

Both articles noted that the party includes a number of independent Islamic figures and distinguished MB members. Among them are: Dr. 'Abd-al-Latif 'Arabiyyat, 'Ali al-Hawamidah, Yusuf al-Mubayyidin, Dr. 'Abd-al-Razzaq Tubayshat, engineer Hamadallah al-Nabulsi, Yusuf Hamdan al-Jabr, Yasir al-'Amri, Khalil Qatawinah, Ziyad

Abu-al-Himmis, 'Azzam al-Hunaydi, Dr. 'Ali al-'Utum, Nasrat al-Baytar, Fakhri Suwaylih, and Dr. Qandil Shakir.

The party also includes a number of women, among whom are: Muna al-Bunduqji, Muna al-Karaki, and Hayah al-Masimi.

## SUDAN

### Former Armed Forces Chief's U.S. Visit Reported

93AF0046A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
5 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by Muhammad al-Hasan Ahmad in London: "Former Sudanese Commander: Fall of Juba Possible Militarily, May Be Postponed Politically"]

[Text] AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that Lieutenant General Fathi Ahmad 'Ali, formerly Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, has recently made secret visits to the United States, where he has met with a number of U.S. officials and members of Congress concerned about Sudan. Lt. Gen. Fathi 'Ali was chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces during the period immediately preceding the June 30 coup mounted by Sudanese President 'Umar al-Bashir.

Lt. Gen. Fathi subsequently formed a military organization called "I Am Sudan." He considered it the legitimate command of the Sudanese Armed Forces.

During his last visit to the United States, Lt. Gen. Fathi met with some of the staff of the opposition Sudanese National Democratic Grouping in the United States. Lt. Gen. Fathi also recently made an unannounced visit to Britain, which lasted more than a week and ended the day before yesterday, during which he met with a number of British officials in various departments, and certain persons in the Grouping's U.K. leadership. When AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT met him and asked him about his visit to the United States and his current visit to Britain, he refused to comment, but did say that they were private visits. AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT asked him whether he had decided to undertake any more private visits to Arab countries soon, and he said, "Yes, of course. Whenever we get an invitation from a brother country, we are happy to accept it. Our desire to make these visits to some Arab countries soon is natural to confirm and strengthen the bonds of close relations that link the people of Sudan and these countries, which the Islamic Front in Sudan seeks to do all it can to impair and upset."

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT asked Lt. Gen. Fathi to assess the military situation in the operations areas in southern Sudan and the resulting effects of the likelihood of the fall of Juba. He said: "From the military point of view, Juba might fall, and for other, perhaps political considerations, Juba is not likely to fall, particularly if a deal is concluded to separate the South from the North. In any case, the summer campaign that the government launched, in which it made use of Iranian expertise, was carried out with an

outright political plan. It did not take into consideration the party loyalties of the selfless military men. It relied upon it as if it were a final plan that was guaranteed to succeed; it was entrusted to junior officers from among the Front's membership in such a way that they had no alternative plans in case of failure. The regime deployed all its capabilities, without holding back any reserves to meet unforeseen contingencies. They used 80 percent of the national income for the summer campaign and pressed large numbers of young men into what they called the Popular Defense Forces—which are forces deficient in training and basically unqualified to fight jungle wars, wars of nerves, etc., in this conflict. So our estimates of the losses sustained by our men in the Armed Forces and the Front's men pushed into the summer war are 10 times the losses suffered by the Armed Forces since the resumption of the war in 1983. Even worse than all of this, the random defense of the Armed Forces in this conflict scattered the Armed Forces in distant and isolated positions—as if the purpose was to get rid of them."

Lt. Gen. Fathi added, "On the other side, had the Popular Movement forces relied upon withdrawing from the cities without the fierce fighting of the Armed Forces, which would have enabled them to conserve, to a great extent, their ammunition and forces, the other to a large extent would not have weakened and cut off its supply lines from Kenya and its opportunities to come in from Ethiopia. They were required to go back to relying on the war of nerves, of which this was the beginning. Its division has increased its fragility, and in my estimation, both sides are in a weakened state to varying degrees. The big loser is Sudan, because all of those dying are Sudanese, and all of the people of Sudan. Also, the destruction and exhaustion of the economy is something that harms all the people of the Sudan, who, perhaps in future generations, will pay the price. The memorandum submitted by the Armed Forces in February, 1989 indicated a political solution as being the best and only solution for the South, but the Islamic Front claimed that it was a memo to throw it out of power, even though there was nothing in it about throwing anyone out of power. It was a call to everybody for solidarity, to reach a peaceful solution, and when the Front turned to a military solution, its authority was finished. Now we are in this unenviable situation."

Lt. Gen. Fathi concluded his remarks by saying, "The constant attack from Dr. al-Turabi on the Armed Forces, and recently in a sermon at a mosque the week before last that the Armed Forces are just forces for hire and not forces for jihad, etc., was intended as the final phase for liquidating these forces, which he sees as enemies rather than friends, and finally replacing them with special ideological "jihad" forces. His attack was no more than an expression of constraint and fear of the onslaught of these forces to avenge their nationalism, honor, and protection of Sudanese territory from this isolated group which seized power in its name. I am perfectly confident that the end of this regime is near, very near, and the constant division of the best officers of the Armed Forces or the oppression and violence that affect all the people of Sudan will not foil the advent of this certain outcome."

Lt. Gen. Fathi called on the Sudanese people at home and abroad to rally around the leadership of the Democratic National Grouping and to stand by the legitimate leadership with material and moral support.

### **Numayri's Former Deputy Removed From Group**

92AF1293C London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 20 Sep 92 p 5

[Text] The Sudanese National Alliance, which is headed by former President Ja'far Numayri, issued a statement indicating that Numayri "stands at the top of the Sudanese national powers opposed the tyrannical regime in Khartoum". The statement denied any trend towards reconciliation between the May group and Numayri supporters on the one hand, and the Sudanese regime, which is supported by the National Islamic Front on the other. The statement also confirmed the removal of Major Abu-al-Qasim Ibrahim, Numayri's former first deputy, from the May group and indicated that Ibrahim had no right to speak about having an alliance with the regime.

On the other hand, the statement issued by Numayri's office in Cairo indicated that the leaders inside Sudan who were siding with former president Numayri had asserted that the news about an alliance between the regime and the May group was false. The statement further clarified the situation by indicating that Ibrahim "had been removed from leading May group work inside Sudan a long time ago and that he was no longer a member of any military or political cells." The statement also indicated that "no organization inside Sudan had delegated Ibrahim to negotiate with the regime or to speak on behalf of the May group."

The statement further appealed to the "May group's solid base" to disregard any statement that "had not been issued by the center." It also mentioned that the Sudanese National Alliance aimed to topple Lieutenant General 'Umar al-Bashir's regime and that "in order to achieve this goal, the alliance is ready to unite with all of the powers that opposing the regime".

### **Garang Renegades Break Out, Flee to Uganda**

92AF1293D London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 19 Sep 92 p 5

[Article by Nizar Daw-al-Na'im]

[Text] Janah al-Nasir, a renegade from the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, declared yesterday that five of SPLM leaders, including its former vice president, Carmino Bol, fled from their detention camp in the regions under the control of SPLM leader Colonel John Garang, and entered the Ugandan territories. Informed sources in Nairobi confirmed that forces under the command of the movement's current deputy, William Nyuan, clashed with forces sent by Garang to the region to get weapons.

From Nairobi, John Luke, spokesman for the executive leadership of al-Nasir faction, indicated to AL-HAYAH



yesterday, that the group of prisoners who had been detained for the last five years managed to convince their guards to release the five leaders and flee with them to Uganda.

The same source added that among the five prisoners was former SPLM Vice President Carbino Bol, who was arrested in 1987 with the help of Ethiopians, after having been accused of attempting to topple Garang. Among the five prisoners were also Arok Thuon Arok, who was both a member of the Movement's high command and an SPLM commander for administration and operations; Faustino Atem Gualdit, an alternate command member; Captain Joseph Malath; and Second Lieutenant Mabior Marier.

Luke said that Garang ordered a battalion to follow the fleeing group. This regiment clashed with both the fleeing group and the guards who had fled with them. The clashes were in the region lying between the two cities of Kajo Kaji and Morobo. Captain Malath was murdered, but the rest entered Uganda safely. Garang forces continued to follow the group inside Ugandan territory.

Janah al-Nasir appealed to the Ugandan Government and to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to protect the fleeing group and their guards and to rescue them from the forces that were chasing them. Al-Nasir also asked the inhabitants of southern Sudan who were still supporting Garang to stop following him and become advocates of freedom and democracy instead. Garang movement representatives in both London and Nairobi refrained from commenting on this news, saying only that they had no information about the group's escape.

Informed sources in Nairobi revealed that forces under the command William Nyuan, who headed the SPLM delegation to the Sudanese peace negotiations in Nigeria last May, clashed with forces sent by Garang in a region east of the equatorial region. Garang forces were under the command of Captain Kwal Manyat. The sources indicated that Noon had not met with Garang since his return to the region, last July. They also mentioned that the SPLM leader sent a battalion under the command of Mayang to take large quantities of weapons from the region, but Noon refused that, and clashed with the forces chasing them near Kajo Kaji.

#### **UN Approves Meat Export Flights to Iraq**

93AF0046C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
9 Oct 92 p 4

[Article from AFP in Baghdad: "Sudanese Planes Carry Meat to Iraq"]

[Excerpts] The director general of Iraqi Airways, Nur-al-Din al-Safi, told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE yesterday that Iraq would import 20,000 tons of frozen meat from Sudan as part of Sudan's food aid to Baghdad.

Al-Safi explained that starting next week Sudanese planes would transport 40 tons of meat daily in direct flights from

Khartoum to al-Habbaniyah Airport, 60 km west of Baghdad, and that the transport company would use Boeing 707 aircraft in its flights, each of which would take seven hours round-trip. [passage omitted]

The Iraqi official said that Iraqi Airways would provide fuel for the planes, in addition to technical services. Al-Safi announced last Monday that the UN sanctions committee had given its go-ahead for these flights to take place, as long as the planes used were not Iraqi. Last year, Iraq imported 15,000 tons of frozen meat from Sudan. The meat were transported by air to Amman and then trucked to Iraq. He said that the international embargo imposed on Iraq since its invasion of Kuwait had blocked air traffic to and from Iraq.

#### **Minister Negates Party Advocating Numayri**

92AF1293B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 20 Sep 92 p 5

[Interview with 'Abd-al-Basit Sabdarat, minister of education, by Mu'awiyah Yasin in London; date not given]

[Text] Sudanese Minister of Education 'Abd-al-Basit Sabdarat said that there is no party in Sudan that is sponsoring former President Ja'far Numayri. He described the group called Mayawiya—in reference to the May revolution that Numayri led—as a group of persons who had joined together solely because they had all been engaged in public work and that this group had no president. Sabdarat added that his government was quite serious about offering amnesty to the opposition but that it was not required to issue guarantees against arrest. AL-HAYAH contacted Sabdarat, who was heading a Sudanese delegation at a UNESCO conference on education in Geneva, by telephone.

The following are excerpts of the conversation:

[Yasin] You are one of the most prominent leaders who are considered loyal to the regime of former President Numayri, who says he opposes Lieutenant General 'Umar al-Bashir's regime. How do you explain this?

[Sabdarat] There is no party in Sudan by the name of "May," nor are there intellectual ideas that are considered Numayri's. Those leaders that are called "Mayawiya" are in fact a group of persons who happened to work together during the Numayri regime. The 1985 popular uprising brought the Numayri regime to an end. The May group has no president. I did not consult Numayri in order to join the ministry, and I will not consult him if in the event of leaving it. All of the May group leaders have attitudes that are similar to mine.

[Yasin] However, Numayri says he has a large base of support inside Sudan...

[Sabdarat] The May group is supporting the present regime because it believes the regime will accomplish all the goals that the group is working for. Besides, there is not a single May member who supports Numayri's politics. Numayri

joined with partisans and sectarians, who are both bitter enemies of the May revolution. He also joined hands with Colonel John Garang, who is the people's greatest enemy. Garang has also abandoned shari'ah, which is the choice of the people. If Numayri wants to rule again, he should ask himself why the people revolted against him after 16 years of his rule.

I believe there is no connection between what Numayri says at present and the principles of the May revolution that he instigated 23 years ago.

[Yasin] The present Sudanese Government is accused of human rights violations.

[Sabdarat] I have no knowledge of any human rights violations against the Sudanese people. I am one of the government ministers, and so far no proposal has been submitted to the Cabinet that would cause us to make decisions that would violate human rights.

[Yasin] The opposition is continuously speaking about the security agency having torture chambers called "ghost houses." Have you not heard about this?

[Sabdarat] Which opposition? Is it the same opposition that issued statements that disapproved of the death sentence that Sayyid Ahmad al-Husayn, former foreign affairs and interior minister, received? And why didn't this same opposition utter a word when it was revealed that al-Husayn was released because there was not enough evidence to justify putting him on trial? This incident alone is enough to arise doubts about the opposition's truthfulness.

[Yasin] You are accused of having multiple loyalties. You were a communist, then a member of the May Group, and lastly, you are working with the National Salvation revolution government.

[Sabdarat] It was natural, at a particular period, to lean towards the communist ideology. You cannot question a person who had been an atheist, about his converting to Islam. The reason for my joining the National Salvation regime is that it advocated all the principles of the May 1969 revolution.

[Yasin] How do you work with a government that is described by the opposition as being rigid. In other words, how do you collaborate with the National Islamic Front?

[Sabdarat] I do not understand this description of rigidity. Rigidity is a trait that the West uses to describe all those who plead to adhere to religion, although, we are instructed to resort to religion. Your opinion about the National Islamic Front is not absolutely correct. This regime does not represent a front. Real national elements work within it. I work very openly with its leaders.

[Yasin] Al-Bashir has issued many pardon decrees, yet they have convinced no one to return to Sudan. Isn't it clear that there is a confidence gap between the regime and the opposition?

[Sabdarat] We said many times that the pardons were for all Sudanese who were opposed to the regime, whether they raised arms against it or opposed it only verbally. Those from the opposition who return to Sudan do not meet with any inconveniences, and they can leave the country whenever they want. There is no reason for the no-confidence attitude, because those who returned were welcomed, and they live in peace and security. But, are we asked to issue guarantees against arrest? If a person in the opposition were to resume any activities against the government, that would place him in a position to be tried. Therefore, there is no guarantee that would permit such a person to resort to destruction and damage.

### Al-Bashir Restructures Security Apparatus

92AF1293A Paris AL-DUWALIYAH in Arabic 9 Sep 92 p 12

[Text] Khartoum has started a series of changes in police and security apparatuses. Analysts believe that these changes are linked to some activities that the opposition military wing had been undertaking in these apparatuses. On the other hand, Lieutenant General 'Umar al-Bashir, head of the military council—the highest authority in the country—tried to establish a link between these changes and what he called "individual trespassings". Al-Bashir accused these individuals of inflicting torture. However, some Sudanese sources asserted that the government was trying to make changes in these apparatuses to make them capable of facing any attempt at overthrowing the regime.

Al-Bashir has released General 'Awad Khawjali, director general of the Sudanese Police, of his duties and replaced him with Major General Hasan Ahmad Siddiq. Informed Sudanese sources indicated that Dr. Nafi' 'Uthman, director of general security, will be replaced by Brigadier General al-Fatih Muhammad Ahmad 'Urwa, who is presently al-Bashir's security adviser. The same sources ascertained that about 400 soldiers from the general security forces have been deployed to join military forces at the war fronts in southern Sudan.

These changes came as a response to outside pressures on the regime. The regime was accused of torture and making political arrests. It became evident that the National Islamic Front, which is led by Hasan al-Turabi, controls a large sector of the security apparatus and had virtually complete control over it. The Front immediately arrests anyone who has a different opinion from it, or whom it feels poses it a threat. Dr. Faruq Ahmad Adam, a former member of parliament and one of the most prominent leaders of the Islamic Front, was arrested in this manner. He was arrested when he announced that he was quitting the Islamic Front and joining the opposition Democratic Unionist Party, which opposes the government.

Both the new appointments and the cleaning up operations of the security apparatus coincided with an announcement by Colonel Bushra al-Fadil Azraq, who is responsible for security at the Sudanese embassy in London. Azraq announced that he was joining an opposition faction led by Lieutenant General Fathi Ahmad 'Ali, former commander

in chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Some of those who oppose the government said that high-ranking security officers working in Sudanese embassies in Europe also had announced that they were quitting the al-Bashir regime.

These differences come at a difficult period for the government. Presently, Sudan has major differences with Egypt, not only regarding the oil-rich Halayib region, but also regarding the role of the National Islamic Front in supporting the extremist movement in Egypt. Egypt reports that large sums of money have reached Egyptian fundamentalists across the border from Sudan and that Hasan al-Turabi met with 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, leader of the al-Jihad groups, in Washington and coordinated ways to shake "Egypt's security." In addition, Egyptian sources assert that some members of al-Jihad and other fundamentalist organizations are being trained in northern Sudan in camps provided by Khartoum. Cairo also considers northern Sudan to be the same region where asylum is sought by those fleeing from the sweeping operations that Egyptian security forces have been conducting for some time in Asyut.

Although news from Halayib about an Egyptian military deployment is not certain, the Sudanese regime feels insecure and is preparing for a difficult period when both inside and outside pressures on it will increase.

#### **Resolutions Adopted by Ummah Party Detailed**

93AF0046B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
9 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by London bureau: "Sudanese Al-Ummah Condemns Khartoum's Human Rights Violations"]

[Text] The Sudanese al-Ummah Party has said that Sudan suffers from a profound governing crisis, and there is no chance for achieving security and peace in the country without a comprehensive solution to that crisis and a return to democracy based on political pluralism, respect for human rights, and the guaranteeing of basic freedoms.

In a meeting held by its executive office abroad, the party emphasized the following convictions:

- The religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity in Sudan must be acknowledged and not subjected to the rule of force.
- The various ethnic groups making up that diversity strive for justice in all areas and do not accept a social system not based upon justice.
- No one, no party, nor any national group has the private right to dominate others; indeed, government proceeds from the basis of securing the rights of citizenship for all Sudanese and guaranteeing their right to vote and their right to question their rulers.

The party sharply criticized the recent decisions of the Islamic Front government, which pronounced the expulsion of several officers from the Armed Forces and the police and their replacement with members of the Islamic Front.

At the meeting, it also criticized, the death sentences handed down against Sudanese citizens in the City of al-Da'in and condemned the mass killing operations the regime was pursuing against innocent citizens in the mountains of Nubia. It strongly criticized the decisions issued by the Islamic Front government relating to Sudanese students abroad, aimed at forcing them to cut short their studies and return coercively to be cannon fodder in the civil war.

The party stressed the resolution of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to refuse to meet in Khartoum because of the blatant human rights abuses of the ruling regime.

#### **Industrial Sector, Mineral Resources Assessed**

93AF0059A Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET  
MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Sep 92 pp 2484-2486

[Article by Sabah Naaoush: "Balance Sheet of Industrial Development"]

[Text] Sudanese industry turns out 8 percent of the country's GDP [gross domestic product]. It employs about 200,000 people, or 4 percent of the labor force. The added value it produces amounts to \$907 million, or 2 percent of that turned out by North African countries. These indicators suggest how far the country is behind in the industrial sector, despite the efforts made in this area.

In fact, during the period from 1987 to 1990 loans extended to industry totaled 1.921 billion Sudanese pounds, or 29 percent of the funds allocated to development. The state devotes almost as much in loans to industry as to agriculture (see MTM, 11 Sep 1992, p. 2356 [not reproduced])

The importance attached to industry did not begin recently but dates back to the period immediately following independence. About 30 years ago the government considered industrialization the only way to bring the country out of a state of under development. However, this policy was not suitably and seriously studied.

During the 1960's the government undertook programs that were extremely ambitious and not very realistic. The objective sought was neither national education nor vocational training but clearly the production of capital goods, part of which was to be exported. The government failed to recognize the mechanics of the overseas market and overestimated the technical capabilities of the country, which is considered one of the poorest in the world. The result, of course, was a total failure.

About 10 years later the government became more reasonable. This was the period when a number of sugar factories and textile plants were built. However, financial problems had already begun to make themselves felt, and all forecasts made were still considered erroneous. For example, the second development plan, covering a six-year period (1970/71 to 1975/76) and prepared with the help of Soviet experts, forecast public receipts of 666 million Sudanese



pounds, whereas the government was only able to collect 250 million pounds. In view of this situation many industrial projects were abandoned.

It was necessary to rely on external financing and to make systematic use of external loans. State debt steadily increased. Elsewhere, under the Encouragement of Investment Act, an effort was made to attract more foreign capital by granting it more financial and tax advantages. However, the problems continued to be serious.

Sudan still lacks sources of energy and has too few cement and textile plants. Meanwhile, industrial productivity might be substantially increased if more efforts were made to improve the political and economic climate.

A certain number of mineral products are found in Sudan: silver, iron ore, copper, gypsum, phosphate, uranium, etc. Furthermore, studies have been made over the past several years concerning the production and export of gold. These studies were entrusted to the Bureau of Geological and Mineral Research (BRGM), a French organization. In fact a certain amount of gold was discovered in the Red Sea area. In January 1992, 80 kg of gold, worth \$770,000, were exported.

In agricultural terms Sudan is a large producer of sesame seed and peanuts. Consequently, the oil seed industry is rather large. The production of vegetable oil amounts to an average of 82,000 metric tons per year. This is one of the few food industries that satisfies local needs. A portion of the production is even exported: 25,000 metric tons worth \$16.4 million in 1990. Thus, Sudan is the second largest Arab country exporting vegetable oils, coming just after Tunisia.

Sudan also has large numbers of livestock. It has several million head of cattle and sheep. However, the leather industry is small. In 1990 exports of hides amounted to \$15.8 million, or only 4.2 percent of the total value of exports. This weakness is due to the lack of chemical products and to the poor quality of the skins. Furthermore, there are only two, "modern" tanneries, located in Khartoum. Among other things, this raises enormous problems for the transportation of animal skins from outlying areas.

The basic problems of industry are concentrated in four products having a direct and considerable connection with social and economic development: cement, sugar cane, textiles, and petroleum.

#### Cement

Two factories, nationalized in 1970, produce cement: the Atbara Cement Factory, built in 1948, and the Rabak Cement Factory, opened in 1964. The Atbara Cement Factory produces 113,400 metric tons, and the Rabak Cement Factory produces 35,700 metric tons. The following data (in thousands of metric tons) shows that total production is well below the capacity of the factories but is also and in particular less than local demand.

Sudanese production only amounts to 0.8 percent of the production of the countries cited in the table [not reproduced] and 0.3 percent of the total produced in Africa. In Sudan there are only the two factories mentioned above, whereas there are seven factories in Libya and Tunisia, eight in Morocco, and 11 in Algeria.

A project for the construction of a third cement plant has been prepared by the government, and the initial work on it has begun. However, after having spent some money on it, the authorities realized that the problem did not lie in the number of cement factories but rather in their total production. In fact, the average output of a Tunisian or Moroccan cement plant is at least 10 times greater than that of a Sudanese factory. It was finally decided to halt construction on this project in an attempt to improve the existing plants. Unfortunately, no significant effort was made in this regard.

It may be noted that Sudan only consumes 720,000 metric tons per year, which is very inadequate for so large a country, with its 26 million inhabitants. This amounts to a consumption of 288 kg of cement per square kilometer and about 20 kg of cement per capita. (For comparative purposes it may be noted that consumption is 13.6 metric tons of cement per square kilometer and 264 kg of cement per capita in Tunisia.) These figures reflect the very modest activity in the public works sector.

Sudan is the only country in North Africa that has a production capacity less than consumption. Production amounts to only 51 percent of consumption, whereas production is 154 percent of consumption in Libya and 230 percent in Tunisia.

The rate of use of the Sudanese cement factories remains particularly low. That is due essentially to the shortage of energy. Sudan is a country that imports crude oil, and its petroleum bill is a heavy burden on state finances. It happens that the two abovementioned cement factories use fuel oil as a source of energy. Very often they only receive half of the fuel oil necessary for full operation. It should also be observed that at times they have to stop operating due to a lack of repair parts. Moreover, this problem is not unique to the cement plants but to all industrial enterprises in the country.

Finally, the cost of production is rather high. It is calculated that the import price (C.I.F. [cost, insurance, and freight] Port Sudan) of cement produced in Romania is less than the production price of Sudanese cement.

#### Sugarcane

Five factories, all of them concentrated in the center of the country, produce sugar from sugarcane. The largest of them is the Kenana Sugar Factory, which belongs to the Kenana Sugar Company. Its capital is basically divided between the state (which holds 33.5 percent of the shares), private Kuwaiti individuals (32.5 percent), and private Saudi individuals (11.6 percent). Built in 1980, this plant

is one of the few companies in the country to use modern machinery. It is also one of the largest sugar factories in Africa.

Initially, the purpose of this plant was to ensure the self-sufficiency of the Arab world for sugar. In that case also the calculations were incorrect. At present the factory produces 305,000 metric tons, which is an acceptable figure in terms of its capacity. However, the Arab countries consume 6,215,000 metric tons of sugar and only produce 2,171,000 metric tons. Thus, 4 million metric tons of sugar are imported per year, which is very far above the capacity and the amount actually produced by the Kenana Sugar Factory. It turns out that even its highest production barely covers two-thirds of Sudanese consumption needs.

The four other sugar plants, all of which are in the public sector, are at Guneid, New Haifa, Sennar, and Hajar Assalaya. Their total capacity is 335,000 metric tons of sugar. However, their production has never exceeded 190,940 metric tons, or 57 percent of capacity. (Production was only 36 percent of capacity in 1989.)

Production, particularly at the sugar factories at Guneid and New Haifa, should increase after 1992, thanks to the introduction of new machinery and the adoption of new techniques. This improvement has been achieved with the assistance of British, German, and American companies, with the financial support of the World Bank.

We should emphasize that the production of these five sugar factories, which amounts to an average of 455,200 metric tons per year, is totally taken up by local consumption. However, if present forecasts are correct, over the coming years the country should export about 100,000 metric tons of sugar per year, instead of importing it.

### Textiles

With the exception of Egypt, Sudan is the Arab country in the best position for the development of the textile industry and the export of its products. In fact, it is a large producer and exporter of cotton. The internal market is very extensive, and large numbers of workers are available, due to the considerable population of the country. However, these conditions are not good enough, in the absence of proper administrative and financial management.

The public sector owns eight textile plants. Their rate of use is no more than 15 percent for the production of yarn and 20 percent for fabric weaving. The private sector also has eight plants, whose rate of use is relatively higher (30 percent for the production of yarn and 38 percent for fabric weaving).

In all, Sudan currently produces 31.4 million meters of textiles, whereas three times this level of production would be necessary to satisfy local demand.

This particularly low relationship between production and the capacity of the factories is due to problems in the supply of energy and to the very inadequacy of these

plants. Their machinery has not been replaced after more than 20 years. And the plants often lack replacement parts.

Financial problems have also been noted, which play a negative role in the prices of textiles and, consequently, in production. The shortage of capital and the deficit requires the private sector to enter into bank loans at high rates of interest. The cost of production is thereby affected, and the price to consumers is increased. As a result, textiles imported from Thailand are less expensive than those produced in the country. We may note that a large proportion of Thai textiles are made with Sudanese cotton, because Thailand is the largest customer for Sudanese cotton.

### Petroleum

It is difficult to estimate precisely what the total consumption of energy is in the country. This difficulty is the result of a lack of statistics and is particularly due to the nature of energy resources. However, according to Energy Data Associates, it is believed that energy needs are about 6.5 million metric tons of petroleum equivalent (TEP) per year. However, it would be appropriate to exclude at this point so-called noncommercial energy resources, particularly firewood used principally for home consumption. This reduces energy consumption to 1.54 million TEP, or 30,800 barrels of petroleum equivalent per day (BEP/J).

As in most of the developing countries, petroleum products are in first place among the various sources of energy. This predominance is even more accentuated in the case of Sudan, because, given the almost total absence of natural gas, petroleum covers 94 percent of the consumption of commercial energy.

We may note the extremely low level of consumption. On the average a Sudanese consumes 5.6 liters of petroleum equivalent per month, whereas a Tunisian consumes 10.3 liters per week, and a Frenchman consumes 12.9 liters per day.

The problem does not lie only in the low level of consumption but also and particularly in the role of energy in the different economic activities. No doubt the use of petroleum products in Sudan reflects very well one of the principal causes of under development. Some 58 percent of the petroleum used is involved in transportation, only 15 percent in industry, and 10 percent in agriculture. Thus, the low level of use of petroleum products in the factories comes from this irrational distribution of consumption. Although the economic policy of the country is characterized by state "intervention" in the economy, not enough of an effort is being made to change this situation.

Because of this shortage of energy resources the government has been interested for many years in local production of petroleum. In fact, an agreement was signed with Chevron Oil Company, of the United States, which, after three years of prospecting, discovered petroleum deposits in the southern part of the country in 1980. Then Total, a French company, made other discoveries in this region. In the same way another prospecting agreement was signed

with Canadian International Petroleum, a Canadian company. This agreement covers a zone between Port Sudan and Halaib. It should be recalled that the northern part of this area is the subject of a territorial dispute with Egypt, which has been going on for a century.

According to our information, it is now known that Sudanese crude oil is generally a low density product. It consists of heavy oil, which is difficult to process locally. On the other hand less is definitely known—for clearly political reasons—about the amount of petroleum contained in the subsoil of the country. Nevertheless, experts use the figure of 300 million barrels of petroleum, which is equal to nearly half of the proven oil reserves in Gabon. These experts think that there is probably more petroleum in the ground. Recent statements made by the Ministry of Energy and Mining are even more optimistic, as they estimate these reserves at 1.7 billion barrels of petroleum.

If Sudan succeeded in producing half of what Gabon produces, it would turn out about 130,000 barrels of petroleum per day. However, the people living in the south consider that this wealth would only benefit the central government. As a result, exploitation of these resources has been prevented.

In purely financial terms the civil war, which is extremely bad for development, has cost a great deal. This does not involve only the military expenditures made by the two

parties to the conflict, but also the money that has not been made. For Sudan could have achieved three objectives by producing petroleum: saving nearly \$300 million per year, on the average, which is the total value of petroleum imports. The country could thus have met two-thirds of its chronic deficit in the trade balance. It could have doubled local consumption by meeting the petroleum shortage in industry and even dealt with the famine, by exporting at least 70,000 barrels of petroleum per day. On the assumption that the price per barrel of crude oil is \$15, the failure to make money costs about \$380 million per year. This is the equivalent of two years' exports of cotton and sesame seeds.

Unfortunately, instead of resolving the civil war peacefully, the government has turned over to Chevron and Total petroleum prospecting in the northern part of the country. Up to the present, these companies have not had satisfactory results. This failure has caused serious tensions between the companies and the Sudanese Government. Furthermore, Sudan has just signed military and economic agreements with Iran. Under these agreements Iran agreed to lend Sudan \$300 million for the purchase of Chinese weapons and to sell petroleum to it, whereas industrial development and the social and economic future of the country requires first of all stopping the war. No other alternative is possible.



## AFGHANISTAN

### Groups Said To Seek Backing for Breakaway States

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[Editorial: "Separate Ways—Guerilla groups in Afghanistan seek backing for breakaway states, report by Salamat Ali and Ahmed Rashid"; italicized words as published]

[Text] The disintegration of Afghanistan that many experts feared would follow the fall of the Najibollah regime in April has moved a stage closer as a result of actions by the mujaheddin factions and their supporters outside the country.

The growing rift is evident on both the diplomatic and military fronts. "There is already an informal ethnic partition of Afghanistan. All sides have started the necessary diplomatic footwork if partition actually becomes necessary," said a senior Western diplomat in Islamabad. Given that Afghanistan lies on the critical fault line dividing Central and South Asia, any partition would have a major destabilising impact on the region.

Afghanistan now is ruled by mutually antagonistic armed groups in three distinct regions: Pashtuns in the eastern and southern areas adjacent to Pakistan; Persian-speaking Hazaras of the Shia faith in the central region extending westwards up to the Iranian border; and an uneasy alliance of Tajiks and Uzbeks in the northern region between Kabul and the borders of the Central Asian republics. Turkoman, Kyrgyz and other nationalities are also present, largely in the north, whose basic language is Persian. The dividing line between the Pashtuns and the Northerners are the Hindu Kush mountains which start just north of Kabul.

In Kabul itself, the ceasefire declared on 28 August is not expected to last, say diplomats. Hekmatyar has already warned the half-million people who fled Kabul during heavy fighting in August not to return. "The next (round of fighting) will be decisive," he said.

In pursuit of partition, Uzbek warlord Gen. Rashid Dostam, based in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, secretly visited Turkey in August and made several trips to neighbouring Uzbekistan to gauge support for a separate northern state for his Uzbek people. In Ankara, he met Turkish officials and held his first meeting with U.S. and other Western diplomats. In Tashkent, he met several times with Uzbek President Islam Karimov; on one August trip he also met Maj.-Gen. Javed Nasir, head of the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] who was touring Central Asia as "a private citizen." It was Dostam's first high-level contact with Pakistani officials.

Dostam argues that a confederation of autonomous states is the only solution to the chaos in Afghanistan. He has warned that the Uzbeks will never again live under Pashtun domination; nor will he pull out his forces from

Kabul as demanded by Hekmatyar. Dostam claims that a separate Uzbek northern state, which would be a secular entity, would act as a buffer for Central Asia against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism by the Pashtuns in the south and Iran in the west.

If accepted, this proposal could lead to at least four, if not more, autonomous administrations in the country, because the Persian-speaking Tajiks would not accept the Uzbeks, who are of Turkic origin, as equal partners. Besides, they fear that Dostam might grab the whole of northern Afghanistan for himself.

Hekmatyar, who has now muted his fundamentalist rhetoric and harps instead on Pashtun nationalism, is lobbying for an interim Pashtun state in the south, which he boasts would eventually impose its will on the rest of the country. But this idea does not appeal to Pakistan, which has a 12-million strong Pashtun minority of its own and views Hekmatyar's proposal as a potentially destabilising factor.

At his base south of Kabul, Hekmatyar has met intelligence officers from his principal backers—Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states—for talks on a "temporary Pashtun state" which would be a pro-Arab, Sunni Muslim entity strongly opposed to the spread of Shia and Iranian influence. Significantly, Arab states have based their intelligence and aid operations in Jalalabad, the de facto capital of the Afghan Pashtuns.

Not surprisingly, the proxy war in Afghanistan between Iran and Saudi Arabia has escalated. There are unverified reports of battles in the south between Shia Hazara and Ittehad-e-Islami guerillas—who are Wahabi Muslims, like the Saudis—led by Abdul Rasul Sayef. Eyewitnesses report that Sayef's forces are aided by several thousand Arab volunteers formerly based in Pakistan but expelled after the April Peshawar accord on an interim mujahideen government. Apart from Sayef's Arab fighters, there are also Arabs based in Jalalabad suspected to be directing various armed operations within and outside Afghanistan. In the later stages of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, these Arabs had organised retaliatory raids across the Oxus River into the then Soviet Union.

It is believed that various mujahideen groups, with an eye on the looming ethnic anarchy in Afghanistan, still have considerable stockpiles of weapons inside Pakistan. On 6 September, the Islamabad newspaper *The News* reported demonstrations in the Bajaur tribal area near Peshawar for the removal of Afghan arms dumps, which have become the targets of attacks by rival guerilla groups. Mujahideen leaders like former Afghan President Sibghatullah Mujadadi and Pir Ahmad Gailani of the moderate National Islamic Front are known to have arms depots in the Pakistani border region. Current Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jami'at-e-Islami group maintains arms depots in Pakistan's Chitral region.

Gailani told the *Review* that during the war following the 1979 Soviet occupation, Hekmatyar concentrated more on stockpiling arms and other resources than on fighting the invader. He believes the Pashtun leader's stockpiles could

last him several years with minimum replenishment. To counter this, Iran has reportedly been supplying arms to Shia-dominated factions.

Hekmatyar remains the crucial figure on the Afghan equation. Most guerilla leaders agree that he would not be satisfied with less than a central role and despotic powers for himself. Gailani says Hekmatyar is the product of Pakistan's miscalculations. He argues that the only way of neutralising Hekmatyar is for Pakistan to abandon its neutral stand and openly back the moderates.

Gailani's hope is based on the fact that, like the mutually antagonistic non-Pashtun factions of the north, the Pashtuns themselves are riven with dissension. For example, the Pashtuns of Kandahar in the south detest Hekmatyar because they come from different tribes. But Gailani warns that Hekmatyar still retains formidable support within Pakistan and could still use his Pashtun card to try to blackmail Islamabad into once more backing him fully.

Many observers think that a Hekmatyar decision to resume the war could prove to be the final nudge down the slope to an Afghan partition. Should he be able to wrest Kabul from Dostam and Tajik leader Ahmed Shah Masud and carve out a Pashtun state, this development—even if it were shortlived—would lead to unpredictable consequences for the region.

Predominantly Shia Iran, which has its own non-Persian minorities like the Sunni Muslim Baluchis and Turkomans, has kept a wary eye on Hekmatyar's links with Arab groups and Arab governments. Tehran would not relish the prospect of pro-Arab groups taking Kabul and moving closer to its borders because this might clear the way for incursions into Iran similar to that staged into the former Soviet Union by Arab volunteers.

In recent weeks, China, too, has repeatedly warned against a break-up of Afghanistan. In Xinjiang, the westernmost Chinese province bordering Central Asia, there is a strong underground separatist Islamic movement which has been backed by mujahideen leaders like Hekmatyar. Even

India, battling Kashmir and Sikh separatists, has expressed fears about the break-up of Afghanistan.

Across the Oxus River, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which contain several competing ethnic groups, fear the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and separatist tendencies northwards. Tajikistan's fundamentalist Islamic Renaissance Party recently forced the resignation of the Tajik president. Worried by the prospect of an influx of mujahideen arms into Tajikistan's strongly Islamic southern region, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan announced on 4 September that additional troops had been sent to police Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan.

Hekmatyar's demand for a separate state is also winning support among Pashtuns NWFP [North-West Frontier Province]. In Baluchistan, too, Pashtuns have demanded a separate province following bloody battles with local Baluch tribesmen.

For the moment, what is preventing more concrete steps towards partition is that none of the major mujahideen players can claim unanimous support from their own regions. Also, for the moment at least, no regional power is willing to risk international condemnation by openly backing its protege's partition plans. Many western governments feel that any new states would not be economically viable; some might turn to increased heroin production for their survival. Afghanistan is already the world's largest producer of heroin.

Afghan separatists, however, have been encouraged by Western recognition of the division of Yugoslavia. This, others fear, has set an unwelcome precedent for the region. So much inter-ethnic and mujahideen blood has been spilt that a genuine ethnic reconciliation or coalition government in Kabul appears impossible. With no one mujahideen faction capable of delivering a knockout blow to its rivals, the civil war is likely to continue, winning new adherents to the view that partition is the only way out of the present impasse.

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